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Abstract 
 
Although there is by now strong evidence that sovereign risk 
premia are driven by a common factor, little is known about 
the detailed linkages between sovereign bond markets. We 
employ the VAR method by Diebold and Yilmaz (2009) to 
analyse the strength and direction of bilateral linkages 
between EU sovereign bond markets using daily data on 
sovereign bond yield spreads and a common factor. The 
forecast-error variance decomposition of this FAVAR 
indicates a lot of heterogeneity in the bilateral spillover sent 
and received between bond markets. Spillover is more 
important than domestic factors for all eurozone countries. 
The CE countries mostly affect each other. Only Denmark, 
Sweden and the UK are rather insulated from spillover. The 
spillover has increased substantially since 2007, despite 
starting from a high level. We use this framework to measure 
the impact of sovereign rating news and analyse the dynamic 
linkages between spreads and the ratings of the main credit 
rating agencies. We find a two-sided relation between rating 
news and sovereign risk premia. The spillover of rating news 
is very heterogeneous, and it is substantially stronger for 
downgrades at lower grades. The impact is often weaker 
domestically than on bond spreads of other sovereigns. 
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Nontechnical Summary 
Financial integration has increased the interdependence between asset markets, and in particular 
sovereign bond markets. The European debt crisis shows that fiscal trouble can transmit in 
unexpectedly fast ways even between sovereign bond markets. Such spillover is supposedly 
driven by conditions on global financial markets that reflect risk aversion. Empirical studies 
typically confirm the rising importance of external factors in determining the evolution of yields on 
domestic bond markets. However, as these studies proxy the global factor with some aggregate 
measure of international market developments we can infer little on the transmission channel 
behind the spillover, and it is hard to explain the feedback between different sovereign bond 
markets. The spillover should not be equally strong between all markets simultaneously. 
In this paper we analyse the bilateral linkages between EU sovereign bond markets over time 
using forecast-error variance decompositions from a VAR with daily data since 2000 on the 
sovereign bond yield spreads of the EU countries. The method allows us to measure the spillover 
from shocks to a specific sovereign bond market to all other markets. The specific control for 
common factors and the time-varying framework are viable for uncovering spillover of a 
contagious nature. 
Our results indicate the presence of significant spillover between the sovereign bond markets of 
EU countries over the whole previous decade. This should not come as a surprise given financial 
and economic integration in the EU. However, the spillover has increased substantially and 
permanently since the start of the financial crisis, which arguably indicates the presence of 
contagion. Moreover, there is a lot of heterogeneity in the bilateral spillover sent and received 
between specific sovereign bond markets. While spillover is more important than domestic factors 
for all EMU countries, the CE countries affect only each other, and Denmark, Sweden and the UK 
are insulated from the impact of other EU countries. 
We then check whether sovereign rating news is responsible for this increased spillover and 
analyse the dynamic linkages between sovereign spreads and sovereign rating actions in our 
VAR framework. In line with existing evidence from event studies, we find that the overall effect of 
rating news on sovereign risk premia is limited, which is consistent with the claim that most rating 
actions do not come as a surprise for the markets. However, the rating spillover is again very 
heterogeneous across the types of rating action and across countries. In particular, the impact 
and the spillover are stronger for downgrades, especially at the lower end of the rating scale. The 
impact is often even stronger on the bond spreads of other sovereigns than domestically. 
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1. Introduction 
Losses on some subprime loans in US banks have had global consequences, as uncovered debt 
positions consequently created a snowball debt effect that brought down major financial 
institutions in both the US and Europe. The ensuing financial crisis called for policy intervention, 
not just by central banks, but also out of the deep pockets of the tax payer. Massive public aid 
provided to the financial sector, together with falling tax revenues and spending on recovery plans 
to withstand the economic fall-out of the financial collapse, unleashed a feedback loop between 
banking and sovereign debt crisis. This financial-fiscal crisis is characterised by the speed of 
transmission and the strength of the feedback linkages across borders and financial markets. The 
sovereign debt crisis in the eurozone is the latest chapter in this financial crisis. Rising sovereign 
credit risk not only reflects structural imbalances and economic divergences, but also has a 
common component because of monetary policy and linkages in the banking market. 
The potency of spillover across sovereign bond markets should not come as a surprise. Financial 
and economic integration has been a gradual process, stimulated by several rounds of capital 
account liberalisation, financial deregulation and innovation, and the introduction of the euro (Lane 
and Milesi-Ferretti, 2008). Integration has not been limited to capital and stock markets. Bond 
markets have become more interconnected too. Whereas in the past, only countries with high 
levels of domestic savings and developed financial systems (based on bank financing) could 
issue debt, many governments can now tap into international capital markets (Caballero and 
Krishnamurthy, 2004). In the eurozone, integration has made bond portfolios increasingly 
internationally diversified (De Santis and Gérard, 2009). Issuance in a common currency has 
motivated debt managers to compete for investors from other countries willing to diversify their 
portfolio by increasing the volume of new debt issues. Improved transparency and the elimination 
of some technical obstacles (such as trading systems and tax differences) has further reduced 
home bias and promoted integration of bond markets (Baele et al., 2004; Pagano and Von 
Thadden, 2004). As a consequence, EU governments have diversified around half of their debt to 
a pool of mostly European creditors (BIS, 2011). However, the recent debt crisis has reversed the 
trend, triggering withdrawal of foreign investors and increasing the home bias again (Andritzky, 
2012).  
Empirical studies confirm the rising importance of external factors in determining the evolution of 
yields on domestic bond markets. Sovereign bond yield spreads should compensate investors for 
default risk, transaction costs (liquidity premium) and exchange rate fluctuations. If investors are 
able to distinguish markets, the spread should depend only on these idiosyncratic variables. 
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However, their explanatory power is rather limited for European sovereign bond yield spreads. 
Instead, conditions on international financial markets may largely explain its dynamics (Codogno 
et al., 2003; Sgherri and Zoli, 2009; Schuknecht et al., 2011; Bernoth et al., 2006; Favero and 
Missale, 2012). This so-called ‘common factor’ is argued to reflect generalised risk aversion on 
international markets. Global investors adjust their bond portfolios when worldwide economic 
conditions change. This is what happened early in the financial crisis: a surge in global risk 
aversion (Mody, 2009) and risk of contagion (Caceres et al., 2010) were significant factors behind 
the increase in European sovereign spreads. Idiosyncratic factors were mostly related to the 
threats that the size of the rescue packages and the position of the domestic banking sector pose 
for public debt (Ejsing et al., 2011; Attinasi et al., 2010; Gerlach et al., 2010). Investors seem to 
have been particularly sensitive to such bad fundamentals and dropped bonds quickly at times of 
increased turbulence on financial markets (Favero and Missale, 2012). Once the financial crisis 
turned into an economic crisis, the initially expansionary fiscal policy response revealed the cost 
to already burdened government budgets. As a consequence, default risk and liquidity risk started 
to rise and the fiscal position became the main determinant of changes in bond spreads (Haugh et 
al., 2009; Sgherri and Zoli, 2009; Barrios et al., 2009; Schuknecht et al., 2011). However, 
problems on some sovereign markets, such as Greece, Portugal and Ireland, then started to 
spread to other eurozone countries via the debt holdings of the large European banks. The 
feedback from sovereign to banking trouble transmitted internationally to affect all large European 
banks (Merler and Pisani-Ferry, 2012). A heated discussion in the literature debates if bond 
spreads are determined by purely domestic elements or if spillover drives them. In the former 
case, markets correctly appraise the fundamental drivers of spreads (Manasse and Trigilia, 2011). 
In the latter situation, there is mispricing and markets are susceptible to be pushed towards bad 
equilibria (Broto and Perez-Quiros, 2011; De Grauwe and Ji, 2012). Policy responses would also 
need to be dramatically different in both cases. 
Most empirical studies cannot detail the transmission channels behind the spillover, as they 
typically proxy the global factor with some aggregate measure of international market 
developments.1 However, the spillover should not be equally strong between all markets 
simultaneously. In this paper, we aim to detail the strength and direction of the bilateral linkages 
between EU sovereign bond markets. The spillover measure is based on the forecast error 
variance decomposition of a VAR model (Diebold and Yilmaz, 2009, 2011). Shocks to one market 
contribute to explaining the variance in the other markets some periods ahead. This percentage 
                                                 
1 Only a few recent studies on sovereign bond spreads have started to separate the role of global risk aversion and 
country-specific risk and measure the degree of spillover in the sovereign bond market. Caceres et al. (2010) calculate 
a country-specific spillover coefficient based on joint probabilities of distress extracted from CDS credit default swap 
spreads. Claeys et al. (2011) proxy the linkages between bond markets by economic distance measures to derive a 
spatial measure of financial integration and show that the spillover curbs around half of changes in domestic bond rates. 
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contribution represents the spillover. We extend the VAR to include both sovereign bond spreads 
and a common factor. With this FAVAR, we not only measure the importance of domestic and 
international events in the evolution of sovereign bond spreads, but additionally detail the bilateral 
linkages between all markets. Moreover, we can infer from the strength of the bilateral links the 
source of the global factor and how it transmits across markets. Using daily data since May 2000, 
we can also track the changes in spillover between each pair of markets over time. 
We estimate a VAR including EU sovereign bond yield spreads relative to the German 10-year 
bond yield controlling for a common factor, and generalised market volatility or short-term market 
liquidity using daily data on bond spreads. The forecast-error variance decomposition of this 
FAVAR indicates a lot of heterogeneity in the bilateral spillover sent and received between bond 
markets. Spillover is more important than domestic factors for all EMU countries. The CE 
countries mostly affect each other. Only Denmark, Sweden and the UK are rather insulated from 
spillover. The spillover has increased substantially since 2007, despite starting from a high level. 
The sources of this increased spillover can be varied. Public opinion has accused in particular the 
three main credit rating agencies (S&P, Moody’s and Fitch) of destabilising sovereign bond 
markets with unjustified and untimely rating decisions. Rating downgrades during the crisis seem 
to have provoked turbulence on asset markets and higher financing costs for all sovereigns 
(Afonso et al., 2011). This spillover is a consequence of increased financial integration. Banking 
regulation, collateral rules, credit default swap contracts and investment mandates force domestic 
and foreign investors to relocate their savings towards higher rated bonds in response to rating 
revisions or adjustments (Sy, 2009). Most existing empirical research uses event-study 
techniques to test changes in bond returns around the date of rating changes. We revisit the 
importance of rating announcements by analysing the dynamic linkages between these discrete 
events and sovereign yield spreads. We include in the FAVAR different definitions of rating 
decisions (downgrades versus upgrades, rating versus revision changes) by the main three rating 
agencies to identify whether the rating action is really ‘news’ or is already incorporated in bond 
market prices, and whether there is a spillover effect of rating actions across countries. We find a 
two-sided relation between rating news and sovereign risk premia. However, the spillover running 
from spreads towards rating decisions seems to be stronger. The spillover of rating news is very 
heterogeneous and it is substantially stronger for downgrades at lower grades. The impact is 
often weaker domestically than on bond spreads of other sovereigns. 
The paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we review our empirical approach to measuring 
sovereign bond spillover based on the VAR method of Diebold and Yilmaz (2009, 2011) and the 
main features of the dataset. The main empirical results on spillover between sovereign bonds are 
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discussed in section 3. In section 4, we extend our VAR model to test the spillover effect of 
sovereign rating news. The final section summarises the main results and discusses some policy 
implications. 
 
2. Empirical Framework 
 
2.1. Measuring Spillover with a VAR 
We use the approach proposed by Diebold and Yilmaz (2009, 2011), which bases the measure of 
spillover on the forecast variance decomposition of a VAR model including prices of different 
assets (xt). Diebold and Yilmaz (2009) start from the estimation of a covariance stationary variable 
VAR(p): 
 
1
p
t i t i t
i
x x 

    (1) 
with xt including n variables and εt~(0,Σ) a vector of independently and identically distributed 
disturbances. The VAR can be rewritten in its moving average representation: 
 
0
t i t i
i
x A 

  (2) 
where some regularity conditions on the Ai matrices apply. The moving average coefficients are 
the key to understanding the dynamics of the VAR. The decomposition of the variance of the 
forecast error of some variable i at h steps ahead records how much of the variance is due to 
shocks in another variable included in the VAR h periods after the shock. Therefore, it shows the 
percentage contribution of a shock to one variable to the time series variation of another variable. 
Call hij  this h-steps-ahead forecast error variance decomposition, and 
1
n
h h h
ij ij ij
j
  

   the 
percentage contribution of hij  in the effect of error variances in forecasting xi due to shocks to xj, 
over all n variables.  
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The method allows us to study the general spillover between different asset markets and dissect 
the strength and direction of the spillover between any two markets. Let us define own variance 
shares to be the fractions of the h-steps-ahead error variances in forecasting xi due to shocks to 
xi, for i=1, 2,..,n, and cross variance shares to be the fractions of the h-steps-ahead error 
variances in forecasting xi due to shocks to xj, for i, j = 1, 2,.., n, such that i ≠ j . Diebold and 
Yilmaz (2009) suggest using these cross variance shares to measure the spillover from one 
series xi to another xj. In particular, we can compute the percentage contribution of a change in 
daily quoted asset prices on the variation in asset prices of each particular market included in the 
VAR model. The matrix Λ of all λij contains all bilateral linkages to and from two different markets:2 
 
AA AB AZ
BA BB BZ
ZA ZZ
  
  
 
        


  
 
 (3) 
The column for a market A contains λAj and can be read as the contribution from a shock to that 
market A to asset prices in other markets. The entry λAA is the percentage contribution of a shock 
in explaining the movement of the market’s asset price. The row for some market B contains λiB 
and can be read as the spillover market B receives from a shock to the spreads in other markets. 
The dimensions of Λ grow quickly when adding new markets, so we need some summary 
statistics.  
The matrix Λ measures the bilateral interdependence between financial markets. The method of 
Diebold and Yilmaz (2009, 2011) improves over partial equilibrium (regression) approaches since 
it does not suppose that the bond market is affected only by some exogenous financial conditions, 
without any feedback. Instead, the decomposition of the VAR provides a general equilibrium effect 
that measures the transmission from one market to another. In particular, it provides an index 
number between 0 and 100 that reflects the contribution of a shock originating in one market and 
flowing to another. The index is therefore not a simple measure of co-movement of markets, but 
measures the importance of an idiosyncratic shock in a market onto other markets, and its 
feedback. Prices move contemporaneously on different financial markets, and this spillover is 
stronger between markets that are more closely connected. 
We condense the information on all bilateral spillovers into a few summary statistics. Using the 
forecast decomposition of this VAR, the total spillover index measures the contribution of the 
                                                 
2 It is like the weight matrix measuring distance spatial econometrics. 
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spillover of shocks between all the variables included in the VAR to the total forecast error 
variance. The total spillover TSh is nothing else than the sum of the cross variance shares across 
all variables (at a certain forecast horizon h). When we express it as a ratio to the total forecast 
error variation, we get the total spillover index, i.e.: 
 
, 1
100.
n n
h h h
ij ij
i j i j
TS  
 
    (4) 
The method allows us to calculate the direction of the spillover. A market i receives a spillover 
from all other n-1 markets, and this directional spillover DSh can be expressed as follows: 
 
, 1
100.
n n
h h h
i ij ij
j i i j
DS  
 
    (5) 
Measure (4) is the sum of the row-elements of the matrix Λ. Similarly, we can measure the 
spillover a market i transmits to all other n-1 markets by  
 
, 1
100.
n n
h h h
i ji ji
j i i j
DS  
 
    (6) 
Measure (5) is the sum of each column of the matrix Λ, not including the own contribution of each 
market.3 The directional spillover details how much of the total spillover comes from, or goes to, a 
particular source. The net spillover from a market i to all other markets j is then the difference 
between the gross shock received from and sent to all other markets, i.e. h i
h
i
h DSDSNS   . 
This measures how much each variable i contributes to all other n-1 markets in net terms. It is 
also possible to calculate then the net pairwise spillover, which shows how much each market i 
contributes to another market j in net terms. For this, we need to obtain: 
 
1 1
100.
n n
h h h h h
i j ij ik ji jk
k k
NS    
 
       (7) 
Since this is a gross measure, two markets may have the same net spillover, but this would be 
relatively more important for a market that exerts or experiences little spillover. We therefore 
define the share in spillover absorption as the share of the spillover that a particular market i 
                                                 
3 Alternatively, one can include the own effect of the shock. 
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receives from all other n-1 markets h iDS  in the total spillover 
hTS . Likewise, the share in spillover 
transmission is the share of the spillover that a particular market i transmits to all other n-1 
markets h iDS  in the total spillover 
hTS . The sum of the two statistics demonstrates the share of a 
market in the overall spillover and is therefore a measure of the connectedness of the market. 
 
2.2. Measuring Contagion with a Time-Varying FAVAR 
The correlation of asset prices can either reflect the co-movement of economic fundamentals or 
be due to the transmission of idiosyncratic shocks across markets. This transmission may pass 
through real channels – which may be explained by trade or financial links – or be due to 
contagion (Kaminsky and Reinhart, 2000). In general contagion is hard to define, and its 
measurement is fraught with difficulties.4 Contagion is usually distinguished from other market co-
movements either by its transmission mechanism or by its size. Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000) 
stick to the first approach, which defines contagion as co-movement between markets that cannot 
be tracked back to fundamental linkage between the two markets (via trade or finance). Forbes 
and Rigobon (2002) rely on the latter and argue that contagion should be understood as a sudden 
significant increase in cross-market co-movement after a shock to one market (conditional on 
market volatility).  
The forecast error variance decomposition-based method of Diebold and Yilmaz (2009) does not 
allow explicit identification of whether the co-movement of asset prices is due to one channel or 
the other. However, we can use matrix Λ as an implicit measure of contagion between markets in 
the VAR framework once we (i) use high frequency (daily) data, (ii) estimate a time-varying model, 
and (iii) control for common factors. How does this identification function? 
By using high-frequency (daily) data, whose dynamics are by nature not affected by 
macroeconomic fundamentals, we can detect from the time-variation in the spillover from some 
specific market to another whether there is a sudden change in transmission. Idiosyncratic shocks 
to a sovereign bond market have stronger spillover to markets when their mutual fundamental 
linkages are stronger (Favero and Missale, 2012). The contemporaneous correlation between 
markets reflects both channels, and contagion is a departure from the usual spillover between 
markets. 
                                                 
4 See Pericoli and Sbracia (2003) for an overview. 
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A methodological problem with using a VAR with daily asset prices is the contemporaneous 
(intraday) correlation between markets. The variance decomposition depends on the ordering of 
the variables in the VAR, and the Cholesky identification of the VAR imposes diagonal block 
restrictions on the contemporaneous feedback effect of markets to the markets that are ordered 
first. Exogeneity assumptions that allow some asset markets to react to others but do not allow for 
simultaneous feedback are not realistic when testing spillover between daily asset prices. 
Following Diebold and Yilmaz (2011) we adopt the generalised VAR framework of Koop et al. 
(1996) and Pesaran and Shin (1998), which allows shocks to all markets to be correlated, but this 
is accounted for by using the historically observed distribution of the shocks. As a consequence, 
these VAR estimates are invariant to ordering. 
Co-movement of asset prices may only reflect similar responses to a common shock. Empirical 
studies have argued that bond spreads in EMU move together and that most of the variability of 
spreads on individual markets is driven by these common factors (Codogno et al., 2003; Bernoth 
et al., 2006; Favero 2012). Since this is a common development, it cannot be tracked in a VAR to 
any specific market. We therefore additionally control for the existence of these common changes 
in sovereign bond market behaviour by including common factors in the VAR. Following Bernanke 
et al. (2005), we use a two-step strategy for estimating this factor-augmented VAR (FAVAR). In 
the first step, we use factor analysis to extract the common factors driving a significant part of the 
yield spreads. The factor model assumes that for a set of n observable random variables xi can 
be written: 
 1 1 ...i i i ik k ix l F l F                                                      (7) 
where μi is a variable mean, lij are coefficients (factor loadings) corresponding to k unobservable 
random variables (common factors) Fij, and i  represents error terms, which are assumed to be 
independently distributed with zero mean and finite variance. The idea is to express n observable 
variables in terms of k unobservable common factors. The coefficients lij represent the factor 
loadings that link unobserved common factors to observed data. The model can be estimated 
after additional moment and covariance restrictions are imposed. We impose the common 
assumption that factors are orthogonal and use the minimum average partial (MAP) method to 
determine the number of factors Fij.5 The principal factor method is then used to estimate the 
factor loadings. In the second step, we estimate the VAR, which, besides the original n variables 
xi, contains an additional k factors Fij. We can then compute the FEVD and use this 
decomposition to dissect the strength and direction of the spillover between any two markets, and 
                                                 
5 The factor loadings lij and the number of factors k vary over time. However, a factor defined over the full sample better 
reflects the co-movement for different markets over time. 
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the common factors. In particular, we can compute the percentage contribution of a change in 
daily quoted government bond prices on the variation in the sovereign bond prices of each 
particular market as well as the common factors. 
 
2.3. Specification  
 
We use daily data on 10-year sovereign bond yield spreads of 16 EU countries over the 
corresponding German bond yield over the period May 2000 to February 2012 (closing price).6 
The use of the yield spread over the reference yield, which is usually taken to be the risk-free rate, 
is common in this literature (e.g. Favero and Giavazzi, 2002). The idea is to analyse only the part 
of the domestic yield that is not driven by changes in the risk-free rate. However, this approach 
has a caveat as it does not allow us to assess the spillover to and from the reference country. 
This may be particularly relevant if the reference country enjoys safe haven status (as Germany 
arguably does) when investors fly to quality bonds. However, the use of alternative benchmarks 
such as the US Treasury bond yield is not feasible given that it is not a natural benchmark for EU 
sovereigns as perceived by investors, and it could overstate the role of common developments in 
EU bond markets and does not allow us to distinguish between common and idiosyncratic 
sovereign bond dynamics.7 Alternative measures, such as credit default swaps (CDS), arguably 
provide a closer measure of sovereign credit risk. However, prior to the crisis, sovereign CDS 
markets were often not liquid and for some sovereign issuers in Europe practically non-existent. 
Figure 1 shows the spreads for four different groups of countries: the core EMU (Austria, Belgium, 
France, Finland and the Netherlands), where the spreads are moderate but have nonetheless 
risen a lot since the start of the financial crisis and again since the start of the debt crisis, the 
GIIPS countries (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain), where spreads have boomed, the 
Central European (CE) countries (Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland) and the eurozone opt-
outs (Denmark, the UK and Sweden).  
 
 
                                                 
6 The main source for the data is Thomson Reuters Datastream. For reasons of data availability we did not include 
Luxembourg or smaller CE countries, which have quoted bond yields only in recent years. For the same reason, we do 
not use sovereign CDS quotations as they were popularised only around the onset of the crisis in 2007. 
7 As a robustness check, we did the FAVAR analysis also using sovereign yield spreads over the US Treasury (in this 
case also including Germany). The results (available upon request) confirmed our previous hypothesis that the common 
EU factor is dominant. 
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The MAP-method selects three factors as common drivers of the bond spreads of EU countries. 
The evolution of all factors is very smooth until the onset of the financial crisis in 2008, but then 
spikes to diverge later on (Figure 2). The first factor started to increase in 2008 as the global 
financial crisis hit the EU and there was a significant increase of yield spreads, notably in the 
eurozone. The second spike appears during the latest acute phase of the debt crisis in the 
autumn of 2011. The second factor reaches a peak in late 2008 and early 2009, like the first 
factor, and since then has steadily declined. The third factor reaches a minimum in 2008/09 and 
has been rising since. 
The principal factor method shows that the first of these principal factors is able to explain over 
70% of the variance of the spreads (Table 1). The factor loadings are close to unity for the 
eurozone countries, which suggests that this factor mostly identifies developments common to the 
EMU.8 Non-eurozone countries have substantially lower loadings on this factor. Instead, the 
second and third factors explain much less of the overall variance and their loadings are high for 
the non-eurozone countries only. This again suggests that eurozone commonalities in sovereign 
spreads are well tracked by the first factor and non-eurozone countries represent a rather 
heterogeneous group. Therefore, in our benchmark case we use only the first factor, but also test 
the sensitivity of the results when more factors are included.9 
The basic FAVAR model contains two lags of the domestic bond spreads of 16 EU countries and 
the common factor obtained in the first step. In line with Diebold and Yilmaz (2009) we compute 
the forecast error variance decomposition at a horizon of 10 days (one and a half weeks), which 
should be sufficient to capture the horizon at which spillover across markets occurs. We 
additionally include in the VAR a short-term interest rate (EONIA) to control for the possible 
effects of monetary policy on the short end of the term structure. Another control variable by which 
we also capture the role of global bond markets is the Chicago Board Options Exchange Index 
                                                 
8 The countries are grouped in this order across all tables: CE countries (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland), core 
eurozone (Austria, Finland, Netherlands, France), Belgium (as will become obvious later, this country stands between 
the core eurozone and GIIPS), GIIPS and eurozone opt-outs (Denmark, Sweden, UK). 
9 We used alternative methods to determine the number of factors and estimate their loadings and these checks all 
provide similar results. A particular restriction is that the factor analysis assumes fixed loadings over time. Given the 
significant changes in European sovereign debt markets, we performed the factor analysis on two subsamples with a 
break date of January 1st 2010. Although the results pointed to some differences between the two periods, the first 
factor consistently explains at least 65% of the variance and the factor loadings did not vary notably, i.e. the loadings for 
EMU countries were close to one, the loadings for CE countries smaller and the loadings for Denmark, Sweden and the 
UK small or even negative. Evidence that the relative importance of different factors varies over time, albeit not greatly, 
is also reported in Broto and Perez-Quiros (2011) and ECB (2012). 
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(VIX). This index is often used to measure risk aversion on global markets. Volatility on markets 
outside Europe, especially the US, is argued to be a main driver of bond spreads. Both control 
variables are assumed to be exogenous.10 
To recap, our aim is to measure bilateral and overall spillover among sovereign bond markets of 
EU countries. We do this by (i) eliminating the common risk-free rate (i.e. the German bund yield), 
(ii) augmenting the VAR structure by the common factor of the resulting sovereign yield spreads, 
and (iii) controlling in the VAR for other common factors such as monetary policy and global risk 
aversion. On the contrary, we do not aim at explicitly decomposing the yield spread into a default 
(credit risk) premium and a liquidity (risk) component. The reason is that we analyse the spillover 
across markets as perceived by financial markets. For the same reason, exchange rate risk (for 
the non-eurozone countries) can be an additional factor of divergence of sovereign bond yields. 
However, we do not find it plausible to adjust for exchange rate risk (e.g. using asset swap 
spreads) since investors effectively bear this exchange rate risk and it affects the  effective level 
of the return of the non-eurozone spread yield. 
 
                                                 
10 In this way, we implicitly benchmark the spillover between EU bond markets also on the evolution of global bond 
markets. We included other control variables such as the US bond yield, but this did not modify the results. 
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Figure 1: Bond Spreads on the German 10-Year Bond Yield 
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Figure 2: Time Evolution of Factors 
 
 
Table 1: Factor Loadings 
 
 F1 F2 F3 Communality Uniqueness 
CZE 0.64 0.58 -0.08 0.75 0.25 
POL 0.33 0.66 0.37 0.69 0.31 
HUN 0.75 0.06 -0.45 0.78 0.22 
AUT 0.94 0.18 -0.15 0.94 0.06 
FIN 0.87 0.37 -0.12 0.91 0.09 
NLD 0.84 0.29 -0.32 0.90 0.10 
FRA 0.96 -0.11 0.00 0.94 0.06 
BEL 0.97 -0.14 0.08 0.97 0.03 
ESP 0.92 -0.28 0.17 0.96 0.04 
ITA 0.95 -0.28 0.07 0.98 0.02 
GRC 0.86 -0.39 0.24 0.96 0.04 
PRT 0.88 -0.37 0.25 0.97 0.03 
IRE 0.85 -0.29 0.15 0.84 0.16 
DNK 0.29 0.79 -0.11 0.72 0.28 
SWE -0.37 0.21 0.44 0.38 0.62 
GBR -0.26 -0.64 -0.47 0.70 0.30 
 Variance Cumulative Difference Proportion Cumulative 
F1 9.60 9.60 6.92 0.72 0.72 
F2 2.68 12.28 1.58 0.20 0.92 
F3 1.10 13.38 --- 0.08 1 
Total 13.38 35.25  1  
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3. Sovereign Bond Yield Spillover in Europe  
 
3.1. Spillover and Linkages across Markets 
Figure 1 suggests that there are important interlinkages between sovereign bond markets, but that 
these linkages are not equally strong between all markets. We first look at the spillover between all 
16 EU sovereign bond markets using the FAVAR model including all bond prices and the factor. 
Table 2 reports the contribution of a shock to bond spreads on other markets. Each entry of the 
table displays the coefficient λAB: the column for each market A can be read as the contribution 
from a shock to the bond spread in that market to bond spreads in other markets. The entry (A,A) 
is the percentage contribution of a shock in explaining the movement of the domestic bond spread. 
The row for each country B can be read as the spillover market B receives from a shock to the 
spreads in other markets. We sum the effect of shocks to market A on all others (either including 
the own effect or not) in the two rows following the country effects. The right-hand column sums 
the effect country B receives from all other markets. In addition, we include the first factor of all 
spread yields, representing the common effect. The column (row) of the common factor represents 
again the spillover the common factor sends to (receives from) individual bond markets.11 The two 
bottom rows measure the share of spillover absorption and transmission. 
Table 2 summarises this directional spillover over the full sample May 2000–February 2012. It 
captures the linkages on financial markets and shows the structure and intensity of the degree of 
spillover between different sovereign bond markets, as well as the spillover between individual 
bond markets and common factors. The total spillover amounts to 59%, meaning that more than 
half of the variation in sovereign bond spreads can be explained by shocks to bond spreads in 
other countries. The remaining 41% of all movements are caused by a purely domestic factor, i.e. 
the idiosyncratic dynamics of the domestic spread in the past. This finding is in line with what other 
studies find: a major part of the bond spreads is determined not by domestic factors but by 
international bond markets.12 In contrast to previous studies, our result is not derived from a partial 
equilibrium assumption, in which global conditions cause domestic changes, but it fully accounts 
for the feedback of domestic markets to international markets. 
 
                                                 
11 There are no decompositions from the exogenous variables (EONIA and VIX) and these are simple control variables. 
The results do not change significantly when we include both variables as endogenous. 
12 Claeys et al. (2011) find that about 60% of a change in long-term interest rates spills over across markets. 
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This total spillover is the aggregate of all the spillover between different markets, but it does not 
reflect the large variety of spillover effects between bond markets. We can observe from the 
bilateral entries in Table 2 that the country-specific effect of spillover is not alike for each country. 
For the eurozone opt-outs (Denmark, Sweden and the UK) the domestic factor accounts for over 
two-thirds of the changes in the bond spread, and for the CE countries (the Czech Republic, 
Hungary and Poland) it ranges between one-half and two-thirds. By contrast, the idiosyncratic 
change amounts to just one-quarter for the eurozone countries (with a slightly higher share for 
Greece, Portugal and Ireland). Hence, the eurozone bond markets are strongly integrated and 
shocks to spreads mostly affect other markets rather than being idiosyncratic.  
The common factor affects – and is affected by – all bond markets. Shocks to the factor do have 
some persistence on the factor itself, but most of its impact flows to eurozone countries. This is not 
surprising given that the eurozone countries achieved the highest factor loadings in the estimation 
of the factor model (Table 1). The common factor has its source mainly in Belgian, Italian and 
Spanish bond markets. The factor has its strongest impact on Austrian, Finnish, French and Dutch 
bonds. Commonalities in the EU sovereign bond market are mostly common developments within 
the eurozone. 
As Table 2 suggests, the bilateral linkages between countries are quite distinct between countries 
inside and outside the eurozone. For the three opt-out countries, the bilateral linkages both among 
them and with the other EU countries are weak. Less than 15% of the shocks to bond spreads to 
these three countries spills over to other markets. The most extreme case is the UK, whose 
sovereign borrowing cost does not seem to have any effect on the other EU countries at all. The 
same applies to the spillover these countries receive. The three countries are relatively insulated 
from bond markets in the eurozone. Nonetheless, Denmark and Sweden are substantially more 
linked to the eurozone because of strong trade linkage to the core countries, and Denmark also 
through its participation in ERM2. A similar explanation holds for the CE countries, whose effects 
on other markets are rather limited, although their bilateral linkages are strong. About one-third of 
all the spillover to other markets only occurs between the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland 
themselves. Despite Austria’s economic proximity and the importance of its banking sector, 
Austrian bond prices do not affect the CE spillover much, nor are they influenced very much by the 
CE bond markets.13 The separation of the non-eurozone sovereign bond markets might be driven 
                                                 
13 For the CE group, Ebner (2009) and Alexopoulou et al. (2009) confirm the dominance of global factors for sovereign 
yield determination, especially during crisis periods. Babecký et al. (2010) find that the financial crisis caused only 
temporary divergence of the Czech bond market vis-à-vis the eurozone bond market. Bubák et al. (2011) look at volatility 
spillover in CE stock markets, confirming increased shock transmission during periods of market uncertainty but also that 
the Czech and Polish currencies, which float freely, are subject to more volatility spillover than the Hungarian forint, 
whose exchange rate is managed. 
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by exchange rate differences relative to the euro area. However, this result also applies to 
Denmark, yet the Danish kroner participates in ERMII with a narrow ±2.25% fluctuation band. This 
finding suggests that there is a distinct feature of spillover in the eurozone and exchange rate risk 
alone cannot explain the importance of idiosyncratic factors. Markets more likely perceive the 
eurozone as distinct due to the spillover of default and liquidity risk across EMU markets, or to the 
likely collapse of the eurozone. 
Among the eurozone countries, we can identify three groups of countries by the strength of their 
bilateral spillover: (i) the core eurozone (Austria, Finland, France and the Netherlands), where 
domestic factors are of minor importance and countries affect each other and are also very 
strongly affected by the common factor, (ii) Belgium, Italy and Spain (though Belgium could also be 
listed in the former group), where the domestic factor is also subdued in favour of mutual bilateral 
effects as well as the effect of the common factor, and (iii) Portugal, Ireland and Greece, where 
domestic dynamics are slightly more important and the common factor slightly less so. 
 
Research Institute of Applied Economics                                                                                    Working Paper             2012/19   pag. 22 
Regional Quantitative Analysis Research Group                                                                         Working Paper             2012/09   pag. 22 
 
 
22 
 
Table 2: Spillover Table, Full Sample (May 2000–February 2012) 
 CZE POL HUN AUT FIN NLD FRA BEL ESP ITA GRC PRT IRE DNK SWE GBR FACTOR From 
others 
CZE 52.52 7.51 6.65 2.51 0.52 0.74 1.65 2.74 3.48 4.01 0.80 0.83 1.94 4.04 0.91 0.03 9.14 47.48 
POL 6.94 61.17 6.38 1.10 0.21 0.22 0.77 1.78 2.44 2.97 1.09 1.12 1.95 5.32 0.79 0.02 5.74 38.83 
HUN 6.86 8.79 54.43 2.35 0.46 0.42 0.63 3.00 2.99 3.60 1.66 1.30 3.10 3.60 0.09 0.06 6.68 45.57 
AUT 1.69 1.54 2.56 21.79 3.83 6.49 9.60 11.01 7.44 9.18 2.00 1.50 3.72 0.39 0.09 0.08 17.09 78.21 
FIN 1.53 0.96 0.79 8.52 26.30 10.77 8.83 7.96 4.45 5.05 1.38 1.38 3.59 0.87 0.41 0.60 16.62 73.70 
NLD 1.60 0.84 1.61 7.77 8.39 25.56 8.39 7.68 5.44 5.29 1.59 2.30 4.36 1.35 0.47 0.97 16.39 74.44 
FRA 1.54 1.33 1.54 9.58 3.84 6.54 18.97 11.77 8.16 11.49 2.33 1.36 3.27 0.98 0.28 0.25 16.79 81.03 
BEL 1.67 1.41 7.12 2.56 4.51 8.10 20.94 13.34 13.60 1.89 2.28 5.65 0.22 0.14 0.07 14.74 79.06 
ESP 1.36 1.04 1.15 5.24 1.43 3.45 6.40 10.64 27.19 14.85 2.93 3.61 7.79 0.13 0.13 0.27 12.39 72.81 
ITA 1.75 1.39 1.39 3.93 1.27 2.62 4.25 12.33 17.65 26.29 3.02 3.68 6.67 0.18 0.06 0.07 13.46 73.71 
GRC 1.12 0.79 0.76 2.59 1.56 1.89 4.81 9.29 9.69 7.78 35.52 6.04 9.02 0.01 0.01 0.11 9.02 64.48 
PRT 0.79 0.67 0.98 2.19 0.27 0.82 1.30 8.52 10.00 6.53 5.93 37.73 16.43 0.01 0.15 0.03 7.63 62.27 
IRE 1.07 0.79 1.00 3.23 1.78 2.44 3.69 7.79 9.77 4.99 5.33 10.31 38.32 0.01 0.05 0.03 9.41 61.68 
DNK 3.99 4.13 4.75 1.25 2.20 2.26 2.25 0.56 0.24 0.32 0.30 0.23 0.33 64.17 5.24 0.18 7.60 35.83 
SWE 1.25 1.01 0.56 0.15 0.58 0.84 0.38 0.23 0.46 0.31 0.04 0.13 0.09 4.70 87.21 0.63 1.44 12.79 
GBR 0.20 0.15 0.14 0.33 0.83 1.89 0.53 0.25 1.97 0.84 0.30 0.92 0.80 0.13 1.14 87.63 1.94 12.37 
FACTOR 3.15 2.27 2.62 8.78 4.42 6.31 8.05 11.53 10.03 11.51 2.86 3.56 6.70 1.18 0.28 0.28 16.46 83.54 
To others 36.51 34.60 34.64 66.65 34.14 52.20 69.64 107.09 107.54 102.33 33.43 40.57 75.39 23.11 10.23 3.67 166.07 997.82 
To others (+ own) 89.03 95.76 89.07 88.44 60.44 77.76 88.61 128.03 134.73 128.61 68.96 78.30 113.72 87.28 97.43 91.30 182.53 59% 
From others 47.48 38.83 45.57 78.21 73.70 74.44 81.03 79.06 72.81 73.71 64.48 62.27 61.68 35.83 12.79 12.37 83.54  
Net spillover 10.97 4.24 10.93 11.56 39.56 22.24 11.39 -28.03 -34.73 -28.61 31.04 21.70 -13.72 12.72 2.57 8.70 -82.53  
                   
Share in spillover 
transmission 
3.66 3.47 3.47 6.68 3.42 5.23 6.98 10.73 10.78 10.26 3.35 4.07 7.56 2.32 1.03 0.37   
Share in spillover 
absorption 
4.76 3.89 4.57 7.84 7.39 7.46 8.12 7.92 7.30 7.39 6.46 6.24 6.18 3.59 1.28 1.24   
Share in spillover 
overall 
8.42 7.36 8.04 14.52 10.81 12.69 15.10 18.66 18.07 17.64 9.81 10.31 13.74 5.91 2.31 1.61   
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The overall statistics listed in the rows below suggest that Belgian, Italian and Spanish bond 
markets seem to create a systemic link on European bond markets. As we can see in the last row, 
the joint share of these countries on the overall spillover transmission and absorption is more than 
50%. The results for Italy and Spain are probably not surprising given the size of those countries, 
and other studies also find that both countries are crucial transmitters of shocks on bond markets 
to other countries. For example, using CDS series, Broto and Perez-Quiros (2011) find that both 
Italy and Spain are more affected by events on other EMU markets than by domestic events. By 
contrast, the Belgian bond market is not typically considered crucial. We find that Belgium is 
actually the most open bond market in Europe: it is the biggest receiver of shocks abroad as well 
as the country that affects the other EU countries the most (in relative terms). The negative value 
of the net spillover and the share in total spillover demonstrate the systemic importance of 
Belgium. The reason is that in terms of size, even if Belgian debt is high as a ratio to GDP, its 
volume is small relative to the debt issues of Italy and, more recently, Spain. At the same time, 
Belgium economically belongs to the core EMU countries, and despite its high public debt it pays 
a subdued credit risk. But moreover, all three countries have an internationally grown banking 
system that is mainly exposed to the GIIPS countries. For example, the Belgian banks Fortis and 
Dexia were among those with the highest exposure to US subprime loans and Greek public debt 
respectively (BIS, 2011). Spanish banks are exposed to problems in the domestic financial sector. 
Belgian, Italian and Spanish banks also mutually hold large portions of public debt (Merler and 
Pisani-Ferry, 2012; Claeys and Vašíček, 2012). Other papers also show how closely linked bank 
and sovereign credit risk are (Acharya et al., 2011). This underlines the importance of shock 
transmission between the eurozone countries through the banking channel. By contrast, non-
eurozone countries are rather separate from this transmission. 
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3.2. Time Variation in the Total Spillover 
 
 
The analysis based on the full sample estimates might not fully uncover the change over time in 
all these bilateral linkages. Indeed, as the entries track the average spillover for a rather long and 
heterogeneous time period, some results might not seem intuitive from today’s perspective.14 The 
financial crisis starting in 2007 is commonly believed to have significantly increased co-movement 
across asset markets and the European debt crisis specifically the co-movements across 
sovereign bond markets since 2010. Figure 1 shows how the spreads of all EU countries have 
been moving closely together since early 2002, and how the GIIPS have diverged from the 
German 10-year bond rate since 2010. 
A Bai-Lumsdaine-Stock (1998) test on the overall structural stability of the FAVAR model for the 
central 70% part of the sample (between February 6th, 2002 and May 4th, 2011) shows that a 
significant break occurs between April 16 and April 22 2010 for the homoskedastic version. This 
break corresponds to the first crisis meeting of the Eurogroup on the Greek fiscal situation. The 
heteroskedastic version has a wider confidence interval between July and September 2009 and 
indicates the switch from the global financial crisis to the eurozone debt crisis starting with 
Greece. The results are robust to using smaller trimming percentages at 1% and 5% respectively. 
Rather than aiming at two (still arguably heterogeneous) subsamples we follow Diebold and 
Yilmaz (2009) and run the VAR model over a 200-day rolling window and reproduce all linkages 
for each pair of markets. 
Figure 3 summarises the evolution of total spillover. We can see that the interdependence 
between markets has not been limited to periods of financial stress. Indeed, the spillover has 
been substantial most of the time, as the index never falls below 50%. We can compare our 
estimate, which varies between 50% and 80%, with Diebold and Yilmaz (2009), who estimate 
such spillover for global stock markets (1995–2007) at between 40% and 55%.15 Caporin et al. 
(2012) use sovereign CDS data and argue that the channels by which shocks on European CDS 
markets propagate have been rather similar over time during the turbulent post-2009 period. 
The total sovereign bond spillover oscillates between 55% and 70% until the end of 2007. We 
observe some specific spikes in spillover over the 2001–2007 period, for example after 
September 11th 2001, the application of the Excessive Deficit Procedures to some EU countries 
                                                 
14 For example, the overall contribution of Greece is very small. Indeed, it seems that Greece is no bigger a shock 
transmitter than, for instance, the Czech Republic.  
15 While our total sovereign bond spillover from the whole sample analysis is 56%, their stock market 
spillover index is 35%. 
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and the revision of the Stability and Growth Pact in March 2005. The high overall level of spillover 
confirms the evidence of other studies that around half of the evolution in bond rates can be 
explained by external factors. The decline in overall spillover since 2006 indicates a period in 
which investors on bond markets started to perceive sovereign issuers as distinct. 
The start of the financial crisis in mid-2007 again raised the co-movement of sovereign bond 
spreads. The spillover index shoots up to 75% and remains at this high level, with peaks of 80%, 
until the end of the sample (February 2012). We observe how the spillover peaks at the height of 
the financial crisis in 2008, when the crisis continues on financial markets in 2009 and as the 
eurozone sovereign debt crisis unfolds during spring 2010. In order to better show the fluctuations 
since the financial crisis, Figure 4 shows a close-up image of Figure 3 starting in January 2008. 
 
Figure 3: Total Spillover Plot, 200-Day Window, 10-Steps-Ahead Forecast, Full Sample 
(February 2001–February 2012) 
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 Figure 4: Total Spillover Plot, 200-Day Window, 10-Steps-Ahead Forecast, (January 2008 –
February 2012) 
 
 
The time-varying estimation of our FAVAR provides some implicit indication of contagion in EU 
sovereign bond markets in recent years. First, although we do not provide confidence bands 
around the total spillover plot, the post-2008 level is arguably an abnormal shift, i.e. the level of 
spillover is significantly higher than the full sample mean (58%). Second, the events around the 
peaks on the spillover plot do not represent news about fundamentals in a large group of 
countries. 
We can discern the consequences of some major events on the co-movement of bond spreads – 
for example: 
A. the collapse and subsequent sale of Bear Stearns to JP Morgan Chase (March 2008); 
B. the collapse of Lehman Brothers (September 2008); 
C. the bankruptcy of Dubai World (November 2009); 
D. the fiscal trouble of Greece (May 2010); 
E. the establishment of the European Stability Mechanism (February 2011); 
F. the spread of the debt crisis to Spain and Italy (June 2011), and the measures adopted in 
August and September 2011 by the ECB. 
 
The total spillover does not reflect the large variety of spillover effects between individual bond 
markets. We can learn more about the transmission across bond markets by looking deeper into 
the bilateral spillover across time. 
B C
D
E 
F 
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3.3. The Time Variation in the Bilateral Spillover 
 
Although the time-varying plot of the total spillover summarises numerous changes in bilateral 
linkages across markets, it is interesting to examine some particular cases. In particular, we 
provide evidence on the evolution over time of spillover within the GIIPS countries, in particular 
Greece, and CE countries.16 
Since Greece was the first EMU country to run into fiscal trouble and set off a series of events, 
such as fiscal bailouts and trouble in the balance sheets of banks, we look in more detail at the 
consequences of shocks to Greek sovereign bond spreads on other markets. As we noted, the 
evidence based on the whole sample suggested that the spillover from Greece is very small, 
which seems rather counterintuitive given the political and economic events since 2009 (Mink and 
De Haan, 2011). 
In Figure 5a, we decompose the total effect of shocks to the Greek bond spread on the spreads of 
the other EU countries. In order not to clutter the graph, we have grouped the countries as in 
Figure 1, but Greece itself is excluded from GIIPS (i.e. IIPS). The first observation is that the 
contribution of changes in sovereign spreads in Greece on other markets fluctuates significantly 
over time and is quite different across groups. The spillover remains stable until the onset of the 
global financial crisis in general and the Greek debt crisis in particular. The CE and other non-
eurozone countries are barely affected, although there can be sporadic large changes in the 
spillover. Most of the Greek spillover goes both to IIPS and to the core eurozone countries.17 The 
crisis immediately magnifies the spillover to other markets but does not change its structure. The 
CE and non-eurozone remain rather decoupled, whereas IIPS and the core-EMU suffer most of 
the rise in Greek spreads. The spillover is very strong in early 2008 as the global financial crisis 
hits Europe. We note that at that stage the eurozone sovereign yield spreads were still rather low, 
but doubts about the budgetary situation of Greece had started to rise. The spillover fluctuated at 
higher levels but decreased to almost the pre-2008 levels in early 2010. This finding is consistent 
with Manasse (2010) and Mink and De Haan (2011), who also argue that in 2010, investors 
started to put a higher weight on the domestic fiscal position and discerned the problems of 
Greece from other EU sovereigns. This reduced the spillover from Greece to the rest of the EU. 
However, we can observe subsequently several reversals in the degree of spillover – both to IIPS 
and to the core EMU. These reversals reflect the ongoing discussions at the EU level regarding 
the treatment of Greece. During the summer of 2011, the contagion to other IIPS, in particular 
                                                 
16 The time-varying plot for any pair of countries can be obtained upon request. 
17 The groups of countries are of different size, but it is still instructive to observe the time evolution of transmission.  
Research Institute of Applied Economics                                                                                    Working Paper             2012/19   pag. 28 
Regional Quantitative Analysis Research Group                                                                         Working Paper             2012/09   pag. 28 
 
 
28 
 
Italy and Spain, rises strongly. The rescue package of July 2011 does not seem to have 
separated the fiscal trouble in Greece from other bond markets. De Grauwe and Ji (2012) argue 
that the present surge in spreads is disconnected from the rise in public debt ratios and is a sign 
of mispricing of sovereign risk. This makes contagion the main driver of sovereign bond spreads 
across the eurozone. 
In a similar fashion we can calculate the time-varying effect of shocks in all other markets’ 
spreads on the spreads of the Greek bond market (Figure 5b). The overall effect is stable, and 
again there are stronger links from the eurozone. The IIPS seem to exert a significantly stronger 
effect since the onset of the debt crisis as compared to the core eurozone countries. The fact that 
Greece has stronger effects on other markets than it receives from other bond markets implies 
positive net spillover of Greek sovereign bond markets. 
While the effect of other sovereign bond markets on Greek spreads is rather stable during the 
financial crisis, the magnitude of the Greek spillover to other sovereigns varies widely and the 
fluctuations sometimes have a very high frequency. One plausible explanation is that this is 
related to the frequency of news related to Greece (Mink and de Haan, 2011). 
Figure 5a: Decomposition of the Effect of Greek Bond Spreads on Other Markets 
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Figure 5b: Decomposition of the Effects of Other Bond Markets on Greek Bond Spreads 
 
 
 
 
 
Another interesting example worth exploring concerns the central European countries, which 
according to Table 2 seem to have strong mutual linkages, but the time invariant result does not 
provide any indication of the direction of this spillover. In Figures 6a to 6c, we again decompose 
the total effect of shocks to Czech, Polish and Hungarian bond spreads on the remaining two EU 
countries. Unsurprisingly, the total spillover is much lower than for Greece and its size is more 
volatile, which corroborates the importance of time-varying analysis. The largest peaks in the 
spillover occur in all three countries during the global financial crisis, whose onset in the CE 
region is commonly dated to mid-2008 (cf. the peak for Greek spillover in late 2007). The spillover 
then fades quickly away only to increase again during the recent debt crisis.  
However, there are some interesting differences between these three countries. The most notable 
is the very strong spike in the spillover transmitted from the Hungarian sovereign bond market in 
2008. This is related to fiscal stress in Hungary, which was followed by a stand-by arrangement 
with the IMF in late 2008. This period could arguably be interpreted as contagion given that there 
was no fundamental similarity between Hungary and the other two CE countries (e.g. size and 
composition of sovereign debt), where most of the spillover went to. After the IMF intervention the 
spillover quickly returned to low levels. It increased again during the eurozone debt crisis, but 
more evenly across the three countries. Overall, it seems that the linkages between these 
countries have become gradually weaker over time. While the Polish and Hungarian sovereign 
bond spillover vis-à-vis the other two countries in the region represented more than half of the 
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total transmitted spillover until the end of 2008, the mutual effect becomes much weaker 
afterwards. This gradual decline is also observable in the Czech Republic, but the spillover from 
its bond market has always been more closely linked to that of the other EU countries. 
Figure 6a: Decomposition of the Effect of Czech Bond Spreads on Other Markets 
 
 
 
Figure 6b: Decomposition of the Effects of the Polish Bond Markets on Other Spreads 
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Figure 6c: Decomposition of the Effects of the Hungarian Bond Markets on Other Spreads 
 
 
3.4.  Alternative Specifications of the FAVAR Model  
 
So far, we have controlled the VAR for common market behaviour by including a factor. The 
importance of this common factor can be seen from calculating matrix Λ for a simple VAR without 
a common factor (see Table A.1 in the Appendix). The total spillover falls, since the feedback from 
the common factor to each market is now incorporated into the evolution of the domestic spread. 
This feedback is obviously stronger for the eurozone countries. The own variable shares (i.e. the 
diagonal elements of Λ) are therefore larger, as is the spillover from the domestic to other 
markets. Therefore, omitting this common EMU factor might cause upward bias in the own 
variance share, as the feedbacks of common events are not taken into account. 
The results of Table 2 also show evidence of additional direct spillover from shocks to sovereign 
markets in addition to the effects of the common factor. An implicit way to take the common factor 
into account is to de-factorise the spread series for each country and keep just the idiosyncratic 
part of the spread of each market. The spillover should just reflect the transmission across bond 
markets of idiosyncratic shocks, now that the common factor is taken out of the model. For those 
markets sharing common developments, the own variance share indeed increases, and the 
spillover to other markets is limited (see Table A.2 in the Appendix). In contrast, the model mostly 
owes to country-specific shocks the deviation from a common factor in markets that do not have 
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much in common with the others. The consequence is that the spillover from these markets to the 
others is much stronger now. Two contrasting cases are GIIPS and the core eurozone countries. 
Since the former have been driving rising spreads in the eurozone, the common factor absorbs 
most of the spillover. Any other country-specific deviation has affected the spread only 
domestically (for more than 50% in Greece, Ireland or Portugal). By contrast, the spread in the 
core EMU has not followed the rise of the GIIPS countries to the same extent, but it is still 
correlated with the spreads in other EU countries (Figure 1). The spillover between the core EMU 
bond market and the other bond markets is therefore much higher (as is the total spillover in this 
model). For the same reason, the importance of the opt-out countries (Denmark, Sweden and the 
UK) on the spillover transmission increases substantially. 
 
3.5. Robustness Checks 
 
In addition, we run a number of other robustness checks, which confirm that the previous results 
are robust to (i) changes in the number of lags included in the VAR, (ii) the number of steps ahead 
when making the forecast, and (iii) the sample window. VAR models with 4 lags (instead of 2), a 
20-days-ahead (instead of 10-days-ahead) forecast and a 400-day (instead of 200-day) rolling 
window all depict similar evolution of the spillover over time (Figure 7). 
 
Figure 7: Robustness Checks on the VAR Model 
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4. Impact of Sovereign Rating News   
 
The long-term rise in the spillover index shows the strong linkages between bond markets, yet the 
high-frequency movements also suggest that this spillover is affected by macroeconomic news. 
Such news on economic or political variables can change the outlook for public finances and 
consequently trigger the sudden sale of government bonds in different markets. The literature has 
focused on different types of news and studied the reaction of sovereign risk premia to events 
such as announcements of unconventional monetary policy measures (Kilponen et al., 2012), 
plans on government rescue packages for banks (Attinasi et al., 2010) and political news 
(European statements) on Greece (Mink and De Haan, 2011). One particular kind of event that 
has sparked quite some controversy in public opinion is rating news. The three main credit rating 
agencies (S&P, Moody’s and Fitch) have been accused of destabilising sovereign bond markets 
with unjustified and untimely rating decisions. Announcements of downgrades of credit ratings or 
revisions of the rating outlooks of particular sovereign issuers seem to have provoked turbulence 
on asset markets and higher financing costs (e.g. De Grauwe, 2010; Trichet, 2010). 
Research on the role of sovereign rating actions has typically applied event studies to test 
whether rating decisions have an impact on returns or just reflect market wisdom. The event study 
compares abnormal differences in returns at selected time horizons before and after the time 
rating news is made public (Afonso et al., 2011; Kräussl, 2005; Ismailescu and Kazemi, 2010). 
Different types of rating news, such as upgrades versus downgrades, outlook revisions or a 
combination of the two, usually have different effects on the yield spread.  
Moreover, rating news seems to have triggered reactions in the bond markets of other sovereigns 
too. This is a consequence of financial integration: banking regulation, collateral rules, credit 
default swap contracts or investment mandates force domestic and foreign investors to relocate 
their savings towards higher rated bonds in response to downward rating revisions or adjustments 
(Sy, 2009). The pre-crisis consensus finding was that due to this portfolio shift a rating downgrade 
would raise the spread for the rated country but reduce it for other countries (Gande and Parsley, 
2005).18 However, this substitution effect in the bond portfolio has not been functioning since the 
start of the financial crisis. Afonso et al. (2011) analyse sovereign bond spreads and CDS quotes 
of EU countries and find a significantly positive response after a rating downgrade. This 
downgrade does have effects on other markets if it concerns EMU countries with a low rating 
                                                 
18 Although most of this effect could have been anticipated in the bond market already (González-Rozada and Levy 
Yeyati, 2008; Ismailescu and Kazemi, 2010). 
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(GIIPS). Arezki et al. (2011) use a VAR model with rating dummies and confirm this result, but 
they additionally show that the effects depend on which country suffers the downgrade, which 
rating agency gives its verdict or the level of the rating (the lower the rating, the stronger the 
response). 
 
4.1 Measuring the Impact and Spillover of Sovereign Rating News 
 
Analysing the dynamic relationship between spreads and rating news is rather complex since 
there are several methodological problems. First, markets anticipate rating news. Hence spreads 
move before a credit agency makes its decision public. Often, announcements of a revision to the 
outlook of a rating are made months before the final rating decision. Second, isolating the effect of 
rating news is not easy since much other macroeconomic news occurs that changes the outlook 
of public finances. This contaminates the sample. Most papers that look at corporate bonds 
isolate the rating decision in a time span during which no other decisions were made or no other 
general news regarding the firm occurred (Mitra and Mitra, 2011). The evidence on the impact of 
rating announcements on sovereign risk premia is even further complicated if we consider the 
triggering effect of a rating decision on other sovereigns. A particular additional problem is that 
agencies often take rating action on several sovereign issuers on the same day and the rating 
action might even overlap with the decisions of the other two agencies. Third, the horizon of the 
impact of rating news is rather uncertain. 
To deal with these points, we extend the VAR model for analysing bond market spillover and 
include a dummy for rating adjustments. Not only does the model allow us to examine the impact 
effect of ratings, but also we can examine if spillover on sovereign markets is special if it is related 
to actions by the main rating agencies or just reflects financial integration and reacts in a similar 
way to any kind of news. Our approach therefore aims to separate the ‘usual’ spillover on bond 
markets from the impact of rating news on bond spreads.19 
We track the effect on sovereign rates following a ‘dummy shock’, as in (8), where zt include the 
bond yield spreads xt as in (1) as well as the dummy for rating news: 
 
1
p
t i t i t
i
z z 

    (8) 
                                                 
19 Unlike Arezki et al. (2011), we include all 16 sovereign bond markets in a single VAR. They are interested in the 
effects of ratings on several markets too, but do not explicitly model the channel by which this occurs. They, by contrast, 
look at spillover between different asset markets on a country-by-country basis. 
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These dummies correspond to the dates for the rating changes and we use a step dummy where 
each rating category is assigned a numerical value (going from a maximum of AAA to a minimum 
of D).20 As in Arezki et al. (2011), this index is summed for all 16 countries in the sample. We 
moreover examine (i) the differential effect of rating downgrades and upgrades, (ii) the effect of 
changes in the revision outlook (negative vs. positive), (iii) the differential effect of the rating 
actions of each rating agency (S&P, Moody’s, Fitch), and (iv) the differential effect of rating 
actions related to single sovereigns. The various types of rating actions probably have differential 
effects and it is not obvious which event represents proper rating news and possibly triggers (or is 
triggered by) sovereign yield spread dynamics. 
The sovereign ratings are the long-term local currency debt rating for each country from the main 
credit rating agencies (S&P, Moody’s, Fitch). As noted before, there are different possible ways to 
create variable tracking of rating actions. Figure 8 demonstrates this. Panel a) tracks the overall 
evolution of sovereign ratings in EU countries (by rating agency) over the last decade using the 
step dummy. In this case, each rating category is assigned a numerical value (from AAA – 1, to 
CCC – 17) and these values are simply summed across countries. Following Romer and Romer 
(2010), we can also choose to include an impulse dummy on the day of the rating/outlook change. 
Panel b) draws this dummy on the date when the rating action (by each rating agency) was taken. 
Panel c) further distinguishes downgrades (positive value) and upgrades (negative value) and at 
the same time demonstrates that rating actions (on different sovereigns), notably downgrades, are 
often clustered within a single day. Finally, panel d) is the same as panel c), but rather than rating 
changes it records changes in rating outlooks, which might arguably indicate rating action ex ante 
and as such might represent real news. 
 
4.2 Rating News and Spillover 
 
We now replicate the same FAVAR model and test for the spillover between bond markets and 
the overall EU step dummy for the rating change (see the upper left panel in Figure 8). Table 3a 
reports the bilateral linkages for the full sample and with the rating variable included as an 
additional endogenous variable. The total spillover is not affected much by the inclusion of the 
rating (it falls to 55%) given that the rating variable absorbs a lot of its own dynamics. The results 
for a VAR including an impulse dummy (see the upper right panel in Figure 8) are rather similar 
(Table 3b). Therefore, rating actions do not have a major impact on the overall spillover within the 
sovereign bond market, which implies that rating news by itself has not been driving the spillover 
                                                 
20 Arezki et al. (2011) include all rating changes in Europe, but find that the EU rating events are the most important 
ones. 
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across markets. However, Tables 3a and 3b provide some finer details on the dynamic 
relationship between sovereign rating news and sovereign bond yield spreads. 
First, it seems that the spillover runs both from bond yield spreads towards rating actions and vice 
versa. The bottom row of Table 3a shows a spillover of 7.42 transmitted by the step-dummy rating 
variable to the bond markets, whereas the spillover absorbed from the bond markets is just 4.76. 
A similar finding is visible in Table 3b, with the difference that the spillover transmitted and 
absorbed by the impulse-dummy rating variable is almost identical. A further look at Table 3 
shows some interesting findings: the countries most affected by overall rating actions are Portugal 
and Ireland. 
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Figure 8: Sovereign Credit Ratings 
a) overall level of EU sovereign ratings (step dummy) 
 
b) rating changes of EU sovereign ratings (impulse dummy) 
 
c) rating changes of EU sovereign ratings by direction 
(downgrades – positive values; upgrades – negative values) 
 
d) rating outlook changes of EU sovereign ratings by direction 
(downgrades – negative values; upgrades – positive values) 
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On the contrary, it is not just changes in spreads in the GIIPS that trigger a rating change. 
Other countries affecting the rating change include France and Belgium. The finding for 
Belgium seems to corroborate the result in Table 1 that this country has systemic importance 
in European sovereign bond markets. The rating decision mostly moves further changes in 
the rating, but given the step values in this series the numbers are hard to interpret. We can 
nevertheless see that rating changes mostly affect the spreads for the core EMU and GIIPS, 
and of course mostly so in the countries whose ratings have been regularly adjusted since 
the start of the debt crisis. 
As noted above, with respect to the decisions of credit rating agencies it is not obvious which 
events represent proper news that might trigger, but also be triggered by, sovereign yield 
spread dynamics. In what follows we explore alternative ways of tracking the ratings action 
than an overall rating level or changes by the three rating agencies along different 
dimensions: (i) distinguishing between rating downgrades and upgrades (Table 4), (ii) testing 
the effect of rating outlook changes rather than rating changes themselves (Table 5), (iii) 
separating the rating changes of different rating agencies, and (iv) separating the rating 
actions on different sovereigns. In what follows we report the results using the rating impulse 
dummy variable as in Table 3b. 
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Table 3a: Spillover Table Rating Step-Dummy Variable, All Rating Agencies 
 CZE POL HUN AUT FIN NLD FRA BEL ESP ITA GRC PRT IRE DNK SWE GBR FACTOR RATING 
From 
others 
CZE 53.74 7.59 6.96 2.50 0.49 0.74 1.53 2.51 3.13 3.75 0.65 0.55 1.60 4.22 1.07 0.03 8.91 0.01 46.26 
POL 6.95 62.36 6.69 1.06 0.19 0.22 0.69 1.57 2.14 2.73 0.93 0.88 1.65 5.50 0.92 0.03 5.49 0.01 37.64 
HUN 6.75 8.58 51.02 2.37 0.51 0.43 0.76 3.45 3.57 4.05 2.02 2.02 3.77 3.37 0.07 0.06 7.13 0.06 48.98 
AUT 1.68 1.53 2.88 22.86 3.87 6.77 9.62 10.82 6.97 8.88 1.78 1.20 3.24 0.42 0.15 0.10 17.18 0.05 77.14 
FIN 1.49 0.93 0.96 8.90 27.92 11.46 8.74 7.52 3.77 4.58 1.08 0.82 2.92 0.97 0.62 0.71 16.59 0.01 72.08 
NLD 1.58 0.81 1.79 7.99 8.61 26.79 8.36 7.41 4.99 4.99 1.38 1.85 3.87 1.45 0.60 1.08 16.39 0.05 73.21 
FRA 1.52 1.32 1.89 10.22 3.93 7.03 19.75 11.52 7.39 11.12 1.96 0.88 2.57 1.12 0.49 0.33 16.96 0.01 80.25 
BEL 1.68 1.42 2.20 7.66 2.59 4.89 8.13 21.47 12.77 13.50 1.54 1.58 4.86 0.27 0.31 0.11 14.92 0.10 78.53 
ESP 1.36 1.04 1.52 5.72 1.41 3.83 6.35 10.48 27.91 15.13 2.40 2.50 6.79 0.17 0.35 0.40 12.51 0.13 72.09 
ITA 1.77 1.41 1.72 4.14 1.23 2.79 4.11 12.23 17.49 27.35 2.65 2.99 5.96 0.22 0.14 0.11 13.63 0.06 72.65 
GRC 1.09 0.78 1.24 2.88 1.60 2.23 4.63 8.59 8.23 7.20 40.94 3.42 7.64 0.01 0.11 0.23 8.77 0.43 59.06 
PRT 0.68 0.68 1.58 2.55 0.22 1.01 1.02 7.85 8.55 6.16 4.65 37.53 15.44 0.02 0.02 0.02 7.44 4.57 62.47 
IRE 1.03 0.79 1.30 3.48 1.84 2.72 3.53 7.41 8.98 4.74 4.72 8.69 39.96 0.01 0.01 0.05 9.33 1.41 60.04 
DNK 3.99 4.11 4.83 1.23 2.16 2.24 2.20 0.53 0.28 0.32 0.30 0.23 0.30 64.23 5.30 0.18 7.56 0.02 35.77 
SWE 1.48 1.18 0.48 0.17 0.69 0.91 0.43 0.20 1.10 0.41 0.18 1.32 0.50 4.58 83.43 0.58 1.99 0.38 16.57 
GBR 0.22 0.16 0.12 0.32 0.83 1.91 0.52 0.26 2.29 0.99 0.35 1.27 0.96 0.13 1.07 86.52 2.08 0.01 13.48 
FACTOR 3.25 2.34 3.12 9.42 4.61 6.84 8.12 11.36 9.40 11.33 2.47 2.75 5.93 1.36 0.48 0.36 16.74 0.11 83.26 
RATING 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.17 0.07 0.08 0.25 0.27 0.08 0.04 0.29 0.06 3.02 0.03 0.15 0.02 0.21 95.24 4.76 
To others 36.56 34.68 39.31 70.79 34.84 56.08 68.99 103.97 101.12 99.92 29.35 33.01 71.02 23.85 11.86 4.40 167.07 7.42 994.25 
To others (+ 
own) 90.31 97.05 90.34 93.64 62.77 82.87 88.74 125.44 129.03 127.26 70.29 70.54 110.98 88.08 95.29 90.91 183.81 102.66 55.2% 
From others 46.26 37.64 48.98 77.14 72.08 73.21 80.25 78.53 72.09 72.65 59.06 62.47 60.04 35.77 16.57 13.48 83.26 4.76  
Net spillover 9.69 2.95 9.66 6.36 37.23 17.13 11.26 -25.44 -29.03 -27.26 29.71 29.46 -10.98 11.92 4.71 9.09 -83.81 -2.66  
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Table 3b: Spillover Table, Rating Impulse-Dummy Variable, All Rating Agencies 
CZE POL HUN AUT FIN NLD FRA BEL ESP ITA GRC PRT IRE DNK SWE GBR FACTOR RATING 
From 
others 
CZE 52.56 7.48 6.62 2.48 0.52 0.74 1.65 2.72 3.49 4.00 0.81 0.89 1.95 4.02 0.91 0.03 9.12 0.02 47.44 
POL 6.96 61.01 6.37 1.07 0.20 0.22 0.76 1.75 2.47 2.94 1.15 1.31 1.99 5.26 0.78 0.02 5.71 0.03 38.99 
HUN 6.87 8.75 54.36 2.31 0.45 0.41 0.63 2.97 3.01 3.57 1.72 1.46 3.14 3.57 0.09 0.06 6.64 0.01 45.64 
AUT 1.71 1.52 2.58 21.64 3.77 6.43 9.51 10.94 7.48 9.13 2.11 1.80 3.80 0.37 0.08 0.07 17.03 0.02 78.36 
FIN 1.54 0.95 0.79 8.44 26.15 10.69 8.75 7.91 4.48 5.03 1.46 1.64 3.66 0.84 0.40 0.59 16.57 0.10 73.85 
NLD 1.60 0.83 1.61 7.75 8.37 25.48 8.37 7.66 5.43 5.28 1.61 2.46 4.38 1.34 0.46 0.97 16.36 0.02 74.52 
FRA 1.55 1.32 1.56 9.51 3.78 6.48 18.82 11.72 8.19 11.45 2.43 1.62 3.34 0.95 0.27 0.25 16.73 0.02 81.18 
BEL 1.68 1.40 1.78 7.06 2.51 4.46 8.01 20.82 13.33 13.53 1.96 2.60 5.73 0.21 0.13 0.07 14.68 0.03 79.18 
ESP 1.36 1.04 1.15 5.25 1.43 3.45 6.40 10.64 27.07 14.83 2.90 3.72 7.78 0.13 0.13 0.27 12.37 0.08 72.93 
ITA 1.75 1.37 1.40 3.89 1.24 2.59 4.20 12.26 17.59 26.15 3.07 4.04 6.72 0.17 0.06 0.07 13.39 0.01 73.85 
GRC 1.11 0.79 0.74 2.61 1.59 1.91 4.87 9.32 9.64 7.80 35.35 5.98 8.96 0.01 0.01 0.11 9.03 0.16 64.65 
PRT 0.74 0.67 0.88 2.25 0.32 0.87 1.41 8.57 9.78 6.57 5.46 36.05 15.92 0.01 0.13 0.03 7.62 2.71 63.95 
IRE 1.04 0.80 0.96 3.27 1.83 2.46 3.75 7.79 9.59 4.98 5.08 9.91 37.82 0.01 0.04 0.03 9.37 1.26 62.18 
DNK 4.02 4.11 4.79 1.22 2.16 2.24 2.23 0.56 0.24 0.32 0.33 0.32 0.35 64.07 5.21 0.18 7.59 0.06 35.93 
SWE 1.26 1.00 0.58 0.15 0.57 0.83 0.37 0.22 0.47 0.30 0.04 0.16 0.10 4.66 86.95 0.63 1.43 0.28 13.05 
GBR 0.20 0.15 0.14 0.33 0.83 1.89 0.52 0.25 1.96 0.84 0.31 0.93 0.80 0.13 1.14 87.63 1.94 0.01 12.37 
FACTOR 3.15 2.25 2.62 8.73 4.39 6.27 8.00 11.48 10.02 11.46 2.91 3.86 6.75 1.16 0.28 0.28 16.39 0.02 83.61 
RATING 0.10 0.01 0.13 0.33 0.09 0.10 0.17 0.87 0.22 0.39 0.17 0.24 1.12 0.03 0.09 0.02 0.29 95.61 4.39 
To others 36.65 34.45 34.69 66.66 34.06 52.05 69.61 107.63 107.40 102.44 33.51 42.94 76.49 22.88 10.21 3.67 165.87 4.86 1006.08 
To others (+ own) 89.21 95.45 89.05 88.30 60.22 77.53 88.43 128.45 134.46 128.59 68.86 78.99 114.31 86.95 97.17 91.30 182.26 100.47 55.9% 
From others 47.44 38.99 45.64 78.36 73.85 74.52 81.18 79.18 72.93 73.85 64.65 63.95 62.18 35.93 13.05 12.37 83.61 4.39  
Net spillover 10.79 4.55 10.95 11.70 39.78 22.47 11.57 -28.45 -34.46 -28.59 31.14 21.01 -14.31 13.05 2.83 8.70 -82.26 -0.47  
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Tables 4a and 4b report the results when we use the impulse dummy for rating actions as in 
Table 3b but separate the downgrades and upgrades (by any of the three rating agencies). The 
results suggest that distinguishing the direction of a rating action matters. In particular, rating 
downgrades both receive and transmit more spillover to sovereign bond markets. The impact to 
and from individual sovereign bond markets is somewhat weaker than in the previous case and it 
seems that rating downgrades follow the developments in sovereign bond markets (the spillover 
absorbed is 4.88) rather than vice versa (the spillover transmitted is 2.58). The latter holds when 
we consider rating upgrades (Figure 3b), but the overall interrelation with bond markets is weaker. 
This evidence is partially at odds with the conclusions of previous event studies arguing that rating 
downgrades have a very significant spillover effect on sovereign bond markets. Although we find 
that negative rating news is related to more spillover than positive news, it seems that the rating 
decisions are followed by developments on bond markets rather than vice versa. However, this 
result can also have a negative connotation for rating agencies, suggesting that the role of 
sovereign credit ratings as forward-looking information is fairly limited. The fact that rating actions 
provide little additional or forward-looking information is apparent from Figure 9, where very few 
rating decisions are taken over almost a decade and are heavily concentrated in the recent 
period. 
Table 5 reports the result when we use an impulse dummy for outlook changes (but in this case 
we do not separate the positive and negative outlook assignments). This evidence seems to 
suggest more intense spillover across markets (as compared to Table 3b). But it also seems that 
rating agencies react more strongly to sovereign bond markets when deciding on changing the 
rating outlook than on changing the rating itself (8.25 vs. 4.39). On the contrary, the response of 
bond markets to changes in a rating outlook is weaker (2.42 vs. 4.86). This may come as 
something of a surprise given that outlook changes signal future rating changes and as such can 
be deemed to represent news more than an actual change of rating. However, it seems that bond 
markets might not be convinced until the change is actually carried out. 
Table 6 disaggregates the impact of rating changes according to the rating agency. Although the 
sovereign rating grades assigned by different rating agencies need not coincide, the rating 
decisions – especially for downgrades – often do. This is evident from the step dummy for rating 
changes, reported in the upper left panel of Figure 9. Still, there are some interesting differences. 
In the pre-crisis period, we can see that while the overall rating level of EU sovereigns was 
improving (a decreasing overall value of the step dummy) according to Fitch and was worsening 
according to S&P, Moody’s took very few rating actions at all. Since the onset of the crisis in 
2008/09 all three agencies have been very active. Consequently, Table 6 reports the rating 
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spillover when the actions by each rating agency are considered separately. This allows us to 
evaluate additionally the spillover between the rating dummies. 
Unlike the evidence in Table 3b (and consistently with the step-dummy approach in Table 3a) it 
seems that there is more effect of spreads on rating decisions than vice versa. In Table 6 we can 
see that this is mainly due to the result for S&P, where the spillover absorbed substantially 
exceeds the spillover transmitted. Second, while there is some kind of interplay between the 
rating decisions of S&P and Fitch, Moody’s is rather detached from the rating decisions of the 
other two agencies. This may also be related to the fact that the frequency of rating changes by 
Moody’s is lower than in the other two cases (see Figure 9). Third, it seems that that Portugal and 
Ireland are the two countries whose bond yield spreads absorb the most spillover from rating 
decisions. By contrast, the spillover from spreads towards rating decisions is driven mainly by the 
spread dynamics of core EMU countries such as Austria, Belgium and France. 
Finally, to evaluate the potential international spillover of rating actions it seems useful to separate 
the rating actions on individual sovereigns given that the severity of rating actions is concentrated 
in a few sovereigns. For instance, Greece was subject to 13 rating actions (including outlook 
revisions) by S&P, Portugal and Ireland to 9, etc. These rating actions are heavily concentrated in 
the later part of the sample, from 2008 onwards. When including the three rating series, we 
confirm the previous finding that rating changes are more affected by sovereign bond markets 
than vice versa. When tracking the spillover of a rating decision on a single sovereign (Table 7), 
the impact of a country’s rating change – in particular a downgrade – affects the sovereign 
spreads of other countries more than its own. For instance, a Greek downgrade affects the 
spreads of Portugal and Ireland, while the impact on the Greek spread is very limited. Similarly, 
the Portuguese and Irish sovereign spreads imply major spillover towards the Greek rating 
variable rather than the dynamics of Greek sovereign spreads themselves. 
 
4.3 Impact of Rating News 
 
The results of the analysis reported in Table 7 suggest international spillover of rating decisions 
on Greece, Portugal and Ireland, which were the sovereign ratings subject to more severe 
changes in our sample. To learn more about the dynamic response of these rating actions on 
domestic and foreign sovereign bond spreads we use impulse-response functions (IRFs). Again, 
we aim at generalised IRFs so that the results are invariant to the ordering of the variables. 
Figures 9a–c show the 90% bands around the bond spread movement of all 16 EU markets after 
a shock to the impulse dummy of Greece, Portugal and Ireland respectively (considering the 
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action of all three rating agencies jointly). Figure 8a shows that a rating change, i.e. a downgrade, 
of Greek sovereign bonds significantly increases the spread for all GIIPS countries, while the 
spread of almost all other countries decreases. Similar findings can be observed in Figures 9b 
and 9c for Portugal and Ireland. Interestingly, it seems that CE countries are perceived rather as 
safe havens, like the core EMU countries. We can also see that most of the impact materialises 
rather quickly, i.e. within around 5 days. After 10 days, the spread rises by 4 to 20 basis points. 
However, it should be noted that most of the rating actions related to these three sovereign 
issuers were downgrades. 
Overall, our findings are in line with previous empirical research using the event studies approach 
(e.g. Afonso et al., 2011; Kräussl, 2005; Ismailescu and Kazemi, 2010). In particular, we find bi-
directional causality between ratings and spreads, a higher impact of negative rating actions and 
spillover of rating news to other sovereign markets. We also confirm that due to this portfolio a 
negative rating action can raise the spread for some countries perceived by investors as being 
similar (GIIPS), but can reduce it for other countries (Gande and Parsley, 2005; Arezki et al., 
2011). 
A related literature uses discrete response models to analyse the determinants of sovereign debt 
rating actions themselves, i.e. which factors rating agencies look at when assigning a certain 
rating level. Afonso et al. (2009) explain the level of ratings by debt levels and output growth, for 
example. Other papers find that the outlook status, past rating events and the duration of the 
existing rating matter (Hill et al., 2010). Empirical studies which, like us, find a bi-directional 
causality between changes in ratings and spreads (Afonso et al., 2011; Ismailescu and Kazemi, 
2010) imply that ratings rather reflect information from sovereign bond markets. In other words, 
ratings do reveal new information to market participants, but confirm existing priors. The habit of 
following the market consensus turns out to be very problematic, especially when sovereign 
bonds are mispriced (de Grauwe and Ji, 2012). This seems to fit well with the recent European 
experience, as prior to the global financial crisis both bond spreads and ratings were subdued and 
both rose in step after its onset (compare Figures 1 and 8a). 
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Table 4a: Spillover Table, Rating Impulse-Dummy Variable for Rating Downgrades, All Rating Agencies 
 
 CZE POL HUN AUT FIN NLD FRA BEL ESP ITA GRC PRT IRE DNK SWE GBR FACTOR
RATING 
down 
From 
others 
CZE 52.42 7.47 6.61 2.45 0.51 0.74 1.63 2.71 3.51 3.99 0.85 0.91 1.98 4.03 0.90 0.03 9.11 0.16 47.58 
POL 6.90 61.09 6.34 1.06 0.20 0.23 0.76 1.76 2.46 2.95 1.15 1.21 1.98 5.31 0.78 0.02 5.72 0.08 38.91 
HUN 6.83 8.76 54.36 2.31 0.45 0.42 0.62 2.98 3.01 3.59 1.72 1.38 3.13 3.60 0.09 0.05 6.66 0.04 45.64 
AUT 1.66 1.51 2.52 21.61 3.79 6.50 9.54 10.94 7.48 9.13 2.10 1.64 3.78 0.38 0.08 0.08 17.03 0.21 78.39 
FIN 1.50 0.94 0.77 8.42 26.20 10.76 8.77 7.90 4.47 5.02 1.44 1.48 3.64 0.86 0.40 0.62 16.56 0.25 73.80 
NLD 1.60 0.83 1.60 7.75 8.38 25.51 8.39 7.66 5.44 5.28 1.62 2.34 4.37 1.35 0.47 0.97 16.37 0.06 74.49 
FRA 1.51 1.31 1.51 9.47 3.80 6.54 18.90 11.71 8.19 11.44 2.42 1.46 3.32 0.97 0.27 0.27 16.73 0.19 81.10 
BEL 1.65 1.39 1.74 7.05 2.53 4.51 8.06 20.87 13.37 13.56 1.97 2.39 5.70 0.22 0.14 0.08 14.70 0.05 79.13 
ESP 1.35 1.03 1.14 5.22 1.42 3.45 6.38 10.61 27.18 14.82 2.99 3.68 7.80 0.13 0.13 0.27 12.37 0.02 72.82 
ITA 1.74 1.38 1.39 3.92 1.26 2.62 4.24 12.31 17.65 26.24 3.06 3.75 6.68 0.18 0.06 0.07 13.45 0.01 73.76 
GRC 1.15 0.81 0.79 2.69 1.59 1.88 4.89 9.39 9.66 7.84 35.26 5.85 8.95 0.01 0.01 0.09 9.11 0.03 64.74 
PRT 0.83 0.69 1.01 2.32 0.30 0.82 1.35 8.64 9.96 6.63 5.87 37.15 16.16 0.01 0.14 0.04 7.74 0.35 62.85 
IRE 1.08 0.80 1.00 3.28 1.80 2.43 3.72 7.80 9.73 5.00 5.36 10.22 38.08 0.01 0.05 0.02 9.43 0.21 61.92 
DNK 3.97 4.12 4.74 1.23 2.18 2.25 2.24 0.56 0.24 0.32 0.30 0.25 0.34 64.14 5.23 0.18 7.59 0.12 35.86 
SWE 1.22 0.98 0.55 0.14 0.56 0.84 0.37 0.23 0.47 0.31 0.04 0.16 0.10 4.64 86.64 0.65 1.41 0.68 13.36 
GBR 0.22 0.15 0.15 0.33 0.84 1.89 0.53 0.25 1.97 0.86 0.30 0.86 0.77 0.13 1.17 87.56 1.96 0.06 12.44 
FACTOR 3.13 2.25 2.60 8.72 4.40 6.31 8.02 11.49 10.05 11.47 2.93 3.67 6.73 1.18 0.28 0.28 16.42 0.06 83.58 
RATING down 0.17 0.04 0.14 0.50 0.47 0.33 0.45 0.37 0.27 0.13 0.67 0.10 0.14 0.15 0.25 0.12 0.57 95.12 4.88 
To others 36.53 34.46 34.59 66.87 34.50 52.51 69.97 107.31 107.92 102.33 34.81 41.34 75.56 23.16 10.46 3.86 166.50 2.58 1005.25 
To others (+ own) 88.95 95.55 88.95 88.47 60.70 78.02 88.87 128.18 135.10 128.57 70.07 78.49 113.64 87.29 97.10 91.42 182.92 97.70 56% 
From others 47.58 38.91 45.64 78.39 73.80 74.49 81.10 79.13 72.82 73.76 64.74 62.85 61.92 35.86 13.36 12.44 83.58 4.88  
Net spillover 11.05 4.45 11.05 11.53 39.30 21.98 11.13 -28.18 -35.10 -28.57 29.93 21.51 -13.64 12.71 2.90 8.58 -82.92 2.30  
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Table 4b: Spillover Table, Rating Impulse-Dummy Variable for Rating Upgrades, All rating Agencies 
 
 CZE POL HUN AUT FIN NLD FRA BEL ESP ITA GRC PRT IRE DNK SWE GBR FACTOR
RATING 
up 
From 
others 
CZE 52.47 7.50 6.63 2.52 0.52 0.75 1.66 2.75 3.48 4.02 0.79 0.83 1.94 4.03 0.90 0.03 9.15 0.02 47.53 
POL 6.99 61.08 6.38 1.10 0.21 0.22 0.77 1.78 2.44 2.96 1.09 1.10 1.96 5.34 0.79 0.02 5.74 0.01 38.92 
HUN 6.88 8.78 54.40 2.35 0.46 0.42 0.64 3.00 2.99 3.60 1.65 1.30 3.11 3.60 0.09 0.06 6.68 0.01 45.60 
AUT 1.68 1.54 2.57 21.78 3.83 6.50 9.60 11.00 7.44 9.17 2.01 1.51 3.70 0.39 0.09 0.08 17.09 0.01 78.22 
FIN 1.53 0.97 0.79 8.52 26.29 10.77 8.82 7.95 4.45 5.05 1.38 1.38 3.58 0.87 0.41 0.60 16.62 0.02 73.71 
NLD 1.61 0.84 1.62 7.77 8.38 25.55 8.39 7.67 5.44 5.29 1.60 2.30 4.36 1.36 0.47 0.96 16.38 0.01 74.45 
FRA 1.52 1.34 1.54 9.57 3.83 6.56 18.97 11.76 8.16 11.49 2.34 1.37 3.25 0.97 0.28 0.26 16.78 0.01 81.03 
BEL 1.67 1.42 1.77 7.12 2.55 4.51 8.10 20.93 13.34 13.59 1.90 2.29 5.64 0.22 0.14 0.07 14.74 0.01 79.07 
ESP 1.35 1.04 1.15 5.24 1.43 3.46 6.40 10.64 27.19 14.85 2.93 3.62 7.78 0.13 0.13 0.27 12.39 0.00 72.81 
ITA 1.75 1.39 1.40 3.93 1.26 2.62 4.25 12.33 17.64 26.28 3.02 3.69 6.66 0.18 0.06 0.07 13.46 0.00 73.72 
GRC 1.12 0.79 0.76 2.59 1.56 1.89 4.82 9.29 9.69 7.78 35.49 6.04 9.02 0.01 0.01 0.11 9.02 0.00 64.51 
PRT 0.80 0.66 0.98 2.20 0.27 0.81 1.30 8.52 9.99 6.53 5.93 37.65 16.46 0.01 0.15 0.04 7.63 0.08 62.35 
IRE 1.05 0.80 1.00 3.23 1.78 2.45 3.69 7.78 9.77 4.98 5.34 10.36 38.25 0.01 0.05 0.03 9.41 0.03 61.75 
DNK 3.97 4.13 4.74 1.25 2.21 2.28 2.27 0.57 0.24 0.33 0.29 0.23 0.33 64.12 5.23 0.19 7.62 0.02 35.88 
SWE 1.24 1.01 0.56 0.15 0.58 0.85 0.38 0.23 0.46 0.31 0.03 0.13 0.09 4.68 87.11 0.65 1.44 0.09 12.89 
GBR 0.23 0.15 0.15 0.33 0.82 1.85 0.52 0.25 1.96 0.84 0.31 0.90 0.81 0.14 1.16 87.61 1.93 0.05 12.39 
FACTOR 3.14 2.27 2.62 8.78 4.42 6.32 8.05 11.53 10.03 11.50 2.87 3.57 6.69 1.18 0.29 0.28 16.46 0.00 83.54 
RATING up 0.26 0.07 0.21 0.12 0.04 0.06 0.09 0.26 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.18 0.03 0.04 0.14 0.04 98.40 1.60 
To others 36.80 34.69 34.87 66.76 34.16 52.31 69.75 107.31 107.53 102.30 33.51 40.66 75.55 23.15 10.28 3.84 166.12 0.36 999.95 
To others (+ own) 89.27 95.77 89.26 88.55 60.45 77.86 88.71 128.24 134.72 128.58 69.00 78.31 113.81 87.28 97.39 91.45 182.57 98.76 56% 
From others 47.53 38.92 45.60 78.22 73.71 74.45 81.03 79.07 72.81 73.72 64.51 62.35 61.75 35.88 12.89 12.39 83.54 1.60  
Net spillover 10.73 4.23 10.74 11.45 39.55 22.14 11.29 -28.24 -34.72 -28.58 31.00 21.69 -13.81 12.72 2.61 8.55 -82.57 1.24  
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Table 5: Spillover Table, Rating Impulse-Dummy Variable for Rating Outlook, All Rating Agencies 
 
 CZE POL HUN AUT FIN NLD FRA BEL ESP ITA GRC PRT IRE DNK SWE GBR FACTOR REVISION 
From 
others 
CZE 52.01 7.47 6.62 2.62 0.51 0.77 1.70 2.85 3.59 4.07 0.85 0.81 1.93 4.00 0.91 0.03 9.25 0.01 47.99 
POL 6.91 61.01 6.37 1.12 0.21 0.23 0.78 1.81 2.47 2.98 1.11 1.12 1.94 5.30 0.79 0.02 5.79 0.02 38.99 
HUN 6.89 8.78 54.35 2.36 0.46 0.42 0.63 3.01 2.99 3.59 1.66 1.31 3.09 3.60 0.09 0.06 6.70 0.01 45.65 
AUT 1.69 1.53 2.64 21.82 3.79 6.41 9.56 10.87 7.31 9.30 1.90 1.59 3.80 0.41 0.09 0.07 17.13 0.10 78.18 
FIN 1.49 0.96 0.81 8.52 26.19 10.75 8.81 7.91 4.41 5.11 1.34 1.41 3.62 0.88 0.41 0.60 16.64 0.15 73.81 
NLD 1.59 0.83 1.67 7.64 8.30 25.55 8.30 7.50 5.30 5.36 1.49 2.40 4.44 1.40 0.46 0.97 16.34 0.47 74.45 
FRA 1.52 1.33 1.58 9.54 3.78 6.48 19.01 11.69 8.07 11.61 2.26 1.41 3.32 1.01 0.28 0.25 16.81 0.06 80.99 
BEL 1.67 1.41 1.81 7.07 2.52 4.46 8.07 20.90 13.25 13.72 1.82 2.35 5.73 0.24 0.13 0.07 14.76 0.05 79.10 
ESP 1.37 1.03 1.17 5.19 1.40 3.41 6.36 10.56 27.11 14.92 2.86 3.68 7.85 0.14 0.13 0.26 12.37 0.20 72.89 
ITA 1.78 1.38 1.39 3.90 1.27 2.61 4.23 12.30 17.57 26.29 2.99 3.72 6.68 0.18 0.06 0.07 13.47 0.11 73.71 
GRC 1.12 0.78 0.80 2.46 1.50 1.78 4.71 9.09 9.51 7.90 35.59 6.27 9.21 0.01 0.02 0.10 8.95 0.19 64.41 
PRT 0.79 0.66 0.95 2.23 0.28 0.85 1.32 8.57 9.99 6.45 5.99 37.23 16.20 0.01 0.15 0.03 7.64 0.65 62.77 
IRE 1.07 0.79 1.00 3.24 1.77 2.43 3.69 7.79 9.74 4.98 5.33 10.33 38.26 0.01 0.05 0.02 9.42 0.06 61.74 
DNK 3.95 4.11 4.77 1.25 2.16 2.25 2.25 0.56 0.24 0.33 0.29 0.23 0.33 63.99 5.22 0.18 7.60 0.28 36.01 
SWE 1.26 1.01 0.57 0.15 0.58 0.84 0.38 0.23 0.45 0.31 0.03 0.13 0.09 4.71 87.21 0.63 1.43 0.01 12.79 
GBR 0.21 0.15 0.14 0.32 0.82 1.85 0.51 0.23 1.90 0.83 0.28 0.95 0.81 0.13 1.13 87.82 1.90 0.02 12.18 
FACTOR 3.15 2.26 2.66 8.76 4.38 6.28 8.03 11.47 9.95 11.59 2.80 3.64 6.76 1.20 0.28 0.28 16.48 0.02 83.52 
REVISION 0.11 0.11 0.03 0.69 0.07 0.17 1.36 1.08 1.87 0.47 0.29 0.73 0.18 0.28 0.12 0.31 0.39 91.75 8.25 
To others 36.58 34.58 34.99 67.05 33.82 51.97 70.72 107.50 108.61 103.51 33.29 42.07 75.97 23.51 10.31 3.95 166.60 2.42 1007.44 
To others (+ own) 88.59 95.59 89.34 88.87 60.00 77.52 89.73 128.40 135.72 129.79 68.88 79.30 114.23 87.49 97.52 91.78 183.09 94.17 56.0% 
From others 47.99 38.99 45.65 78.18 73.81 74.45 80.99 79.10 72.89 73.71 64.41 62.77 61.74 36.01 12.79 12.18 83.52 8.25  
Net spillover 11.41 4.41 10.66 11.13 40.00 22.48 10.27 -28.40 -35.72 -29.79 31.12 20.70 -14.23 12.51 2.48 8.22 -83.09 5.83  
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Table 6: Spillover Table, Rating Impulse-Dummy Variable, Rating Agencies Separately 
 
 CZE POL HUN AUT FIN NLD FRA BEL ESP ITA GRC PRT IRE DNK SWE GBR FACTOR
RATING
Fitch 
RATING
Moody’s 
RATING 
S&P 
From 
others 
CZE 52.46 7.46 6.53 2.46 0.51 0.72 1.63 2.75 3.52 4.01 0.80 0.86 2.00 4.01 0.91 0.02 9.07 0.24 0.00 0.04 47.54 
POL 6.95 61.13 6.37 1.05 0.19 0.21 0.75 1.76 2.44 2.95 1.12 1.25 1.92 5.27 0.78 0.02 5.65 0.16 0.01 0.01 38.87 
HUN 6.82 8.72 54.23 2.29 0.44 0.40 0.62 3.00 3.03 3.58 1.69 1.42 3.19 3.55 0.09 0.06 6.60 0.17 0.02 0.09 45.77 
AUT 1.71 1.51 2.58 21.56 3.75 6.39 9.48 10.93 7.47 9.13 2.11 1.80 3.82 0.37 0.08 0.08 16.98 0.12 0.01 0.10 78.44 
FIN 1.55 0.94 0.80 8.44 26.12 10.68 8.76 7.93 4.46 5.04 1.45 1.62 3.62 0.85 0.41 0.59 16.55 0.17 0.00 0.01 73.88 
NLD 1.59 0.83 1.60 7.73 8.34 25.38 8.34 7.68 5.45 5.30 1.61 2.45 4.44 1.35 0.47 0.97 16.32 0.01 0.00 0.13 74.62 
FRA 1.56 1.32 1.57 9.48 3.76 6.46 18.76 11.69 8.17 11.43 2.43 1.64 3.37 0.96 0.27 0.25 16.70 0.10 0.01 0.04 81.24 
BEL 1.70 1.40 1.81 7.05 2.50 4.45 7.99 20.72 13.28 13.49 1.99 2.65 5.76 0.22 0.14 0.07 14.65 0.02 0.01 0.10 79.28 
ESP 1.37 1.03 1.18 5.25 1.42 3.44 6.41 10.64 27.02 14.88 2.90 3.73 7.70 0.14 0.14 0.26 12.36 0.00 0.08 0.05 72.98 
ITA 1.78 1.38 1.44 3.90 1.24 2.60 4.21 12.23 17.52 26.12 3.09 4.10 6.69 0.18 0.06 0.07 13.39 0.00 0.01 0.02 73.88 
GRC 1.12 0.78 0.75 2.60 1.58 1.91 4.89 9.34 9.57 7.80 35.48 5.98 8.86 0.01 0.01 0.10 9.00 0.01 0.15 0.06 64.52 
PRT 0.72 0.65 0.85 2.21 0.31 0.84 1.39 8.62 9.75 6.57 5.36 36.10 15.91 0.01 0.13 0.04 7.53 0.22 1.46 1.33 63.90 
IRE 1.07 0.77 1.01 3.27 1.80 2.44 3.79 7.82 9.48 5.04 5.05 9.87 37.57 0.01 0.04 0.02 9.35 0.30 1.11 0.20 62.43 
DNK 4.03 4.11 4.80 1.22 2.16 2.24 2.23 0.56 0.25 0.32 0.33 0.31 0.34 64.08 5.20 0.17 7.58 0.02 0.03 0.02 35.92 
SWE 1.26 0.99 0.57 0.15 0.56 0.83 0.37 0.23 0.46 0.30 0.04 0.15 0.09 4.65 87.01 0.62 1.42 0.12 0.12 0.07 12.99 
GBR 0.20 0.14 0.13 0.33 0.83 1.89 0.52 0.26 1.96 0.83 0.30 0.91 0.79 0.12 1.13 87.58 1.92 0.03 0.08 0.03 12.42 
FACTOR 3.16 2.24 2.63 8.71 4.37 6.25 8.00 11.48 9.99 11.47 2.90 3.86 6.73 1.17 0.28 0.27 16.36 0.03 0.01 0.07 83.64 
RATING Fitch 0.12 0.04 0.08 0.18 0.32 0.12 0.48 0.19 0.07 0.06 0.01 0.04 0.55 0.01 0.07 0.04 0.17 97.01 0.10 0.33 2.99 
RATING Moody’s 0.07 0.01 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.07 0.05 0.31 0.07 0.12 0.08 0.05 0.10 0.05 0.19 0.31 0.02 0.08 98.23 0.04 1.77 
RATING S&P 0.03 0.04 0.19 1.13 0.02 0.39 1.06 1.73 0.60 0.95 0.18 0.37 0.82 0.08 0.13 0.06 1.05 0.32 0.10 90.75 9.25 
To others 36.79 34.34 34.95 67.49 34.14 52.34 70.96 109.16 107.54 103.27 33.45 43.08 76.70 23.00 10.52 4.03 166.32 2.14 3.33 2.78 1016.32 
To others (+ own) 89.24 95.47 89.18 89.05 60.26 77.72 89.73 129.88 134.56 129.39 68.93 79.18 114.27 87.08 97.53 91.61 182.68 99.15 101.56 93.53 50.8% 
From others 47.54 38.87 45.77 78.44 73.88 74.62 81.24 79.28 72.98 73.88 64.52 63.90 62.43 35.92 12.99 12.42 83.64 2.99 1.77 9.25  
Net spillover 10.76 4.53 10.82 10.95 39.74 22.28 10.27 -29.88 -34.56 -29.39 31.07 20.82 -14.27 12.92 2.47 8.39 -82.68 0.85 -1.56 6.47  
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Table 7: Spillover Table, Rating Impulse-Dummy Variable for Greece, Ireland and Portugal Separately, All Rating Agencies 
 
 CZE POL HUN AUT FIN NLD FRA BEL ESP ITA GRC PRT IRE DNK SWE GBR FACTOR
RATING 
GRC 
RATING 
IRL 
RATING 
PRT 
From 
others 
CZE 52.45 7.46 6.62 2.46 0.48 0.70 1.62 2.71 3.52 3.99 0.81 0.91 1.86 4.00 0.92 0.03 9.05 0.05 0.02 0.32 47.55 
POL 6.88 61.09 6.36 1.08 0.19 0.21 0.76 1.78 2.47 2.95 1.10 1.21 1.95 5.27 0.79 0.02 5.70 0.03 0.02 0.12 38.91 
HUN 6.82 8.78 54.56 2.29 0.41 0.38 0.61 2.94 3.01 3.56 1.71 1.40 2.99 3.58 0.09 0.06 6.57 0.00 0.18 0.06 45.44 
AUT 1.65 1.52 2.55 21.78 3.74 6.38 9.58 10.99 7.51 9.18 2.05 1.65 3.59 0.38 0.10 0.08 17.03 0.06 0.01 0.16 78.22 
FIN 1.50 0.95 0.77 8.46 26.27 10.67 8.82 7.95 4.51 5.06 1.42 1.52 3.50 0.85 0.43 0.59 16.59 0.07 0.01 0.06 73.73 
NLD 1.58 0.83 1.60 7.75 8.34 25.55 8.39 7.66 5.48 5.28 1.63 2.44 4.26 1.34 0.48 0.98 16.37 0.02 0.00 0.02 74.45 
FRA 1.50 1.32 1.54 9.56 3.78 6.47 19.00 11.75 8.20 11.46 2.37 1.47 3.13 0.97 0.29 0.27 16.74 0.01 0.01 0.18 81.00 
BEL 1.65 1.41 1.77 7.12 2.52 4.46 8.10 20.96 13.41 13.58 1.93 2.39 5.46 0.22 0.15 0.08 14.73 0.00 0.00 0.07 79.04 
ESP 1.34 1.04 1.16 5.25 1.42 3.41 6.38 10.56 27.20 14.75 2.97 3.72 7.55 0.14 0.14 0.29 12.35 0.04 0.02 0.27 72.80 
ITA 1.72 1.39 1.40 3.95 1.26 2.59 4.24 12.30 17.69 26.24 3.05 3.79 6.50 0.18 0.06 0.08 13.45 0.02 0.01 0.07 73.76 
GRC 1.11 0.79 0.77 2.61 1.58 1.92 4.82 9.31 9.69 7.75 35.32 6.02 9.01 0.01 0.01 0.11 9.05 0.08 0.01 0.03 64.68 
PRT 0.83 0.69 0.98 2.26 0.30 0.87 1.34 8.54 9.92 6.56 5.86 36.79 16.44 0.01 0.15 0.03 7.73 0.33 0.01 0.36 63.21 
IRE 1.03 0.79 1.00 3.19 1.74 2.37 3.63 7.64 9.71 4.88 5.40 10.62 37.58 0.01 0.04 0.03 9.28 0.96 0.02 0.08 62.42 
DNK 3.97 4.10 4.76 1.24 2.17 2.25 2.26 0.58 0.24 0.33 0.29 0.26 0.35 64.09 5.25 0.17 7.63 0.01 0.02 0.04 35.91 
SWE 1.24 1.00 0.56 0.15 0.59 0.86 0.38 0.23 0.47 0.31 0.03 0.12 0.09 4.68 86.96 0.64 1.44 0.01 0.01 0.24 13.04 
GBR 0.21 0.14 0.12 0.32 0.80 1.82 0.52 0.25 2.01 0.85 0.32 0.96 0.84 0.12 1.16 87.43 1.91 0.06 0.14 0.03 12.57 
FACTOR 3.11 2.26 2.62 8.77 4.37 6.25 8.04 11.52 10.10 11.49 2.91 3.73 6.55 1.18 0.30 0.28 16.43 0.00 0.01 0.07 83.57 
RATING GRC 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.18 0.33 0.21 0.10 0.08 0.04 0.08 0.34 1.91 0.06 0.02 0.05 0.05 96.41 0.01 0.02 3.59 
RATING IRL 0.04 0.01 0.20 0.07 0.09 0.10 0.08 0.03 0.06 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.12 0.13 0.05 0.01 98.89 0.02 1.11 
RATING PRT 0.47 0.06 0.04 0.41 0.19 0.24 0.57 0.91 0.27 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.62 0.09 0.28 0.04 0.38 0.02 0.01 95.07 4.93 
To others 36.65 34.53 34.82 67.02 34.16 52.29 70.34 107.76 108.37 102.12 34.06 42.68 76.65 23.11 10.79 3.97 166.12 1.80 0.50 2.20 1009.94 
To others (+ own) 89.11 95.63 89.38 88.80 60.43 77.84 89.33 128.72 135.57 128.36 69.37 79.47 114.23 87.20 97.75 91.39 182.55 98.21 99.39 97.27 50.5% 
From others 47.55 38.91 45.44 78.22 73.73 74.45 81.00 79.04 72.80 73.76 64.68 63.21 62.42 35.91 13.04 12.57 83.57 3.59 1.11 4.93  
Net spillover 10.89 4.37 10.62 11.20 39.57 22.16 10.67 -28.72 -35.57 -28.36 30.63 20.53 -14.23 12.80 2.25 8.61 -82.55 1.79 0.61 2.73  
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Figure 9a: VAR Model: Sovereign Spread Response to Change in Rating (Change in Rating of Greece) 
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 Figure 9b: VAR Model: Sovereign Spread Response to Change in Rating (Change in Rating of Portugal) 
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Figure 9c: VAR Model: Sovereign Spread Response to Change in Rating (Change in Rating of Ireland) 
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5. Conclusion 
 
 
The speed and depth with which fiscal problems have spread across eurozone countries has 
come as a surprise to markets. Although there is quite some evidence that sovereign risk premia 
are driven by a common or global factor, especially in emerging market economies, this kind of 
contagion was not expected to happen in the EU. Events since the start of the debt crisis in May 
2010, coupled with a very rapid rise in bond spreads and the downgrading of all EMU countries 
but Germany, show that Europe is not immune to contagion on sovereign bond markets.  
In this paper, we analyse the bilateral linkages between sovereign bond markets in detail using 
the forecast-error variance decompositions from a VAR with daily sovereign bond spreads vis-à-
vis Germany since 2000. Our results indicate that the spillover has increased substantially and 
permanently since 2007 but that there is a lot of heterogeneity in the bilateral spillover sent and 
received between specific markets. Spillover is more important than domestic factors for all EMU 
countries due to the importance of a common factor as well as bilateral linkages. The CE 
countries affect each other, but Denmark, Sweden and the UK are insulated from the impact of 
other EU countries.  
Our VAR-based evidence on rating announcements is in general consistent with previous studies 
on EMU countries, but a few findings are substantially different. We find that sovereign rating 
news contains some new information and has a significant impact on spreads. However, in most 
cases the spillover running from spreads towards rating decisions is similar or even stronger. This 
result, which is robust across different alternatives of the rating variable in the VAR, suggests that 
in general rating actions react to sovereign bond market developments rather than providing much 
additional information. Still, even though the effect of rating news on sovereign spreads is not in 
general very strong, its effect can be nonlinear. Consistently, we find that rating actions on most 
troubled sovereigns (Greece, Ireland and Portugal), i.e. mainly downgrades near or within the 
speculative grade, spill over internationally. The effect is immediate and generalised but rather 
heterogeneous. Indeed, while the spreads for some countries widen, those for some others 
narrow due to reallocation of investments.  
There are several possible extensions to the analysis of rating decisions in this paper. First, we 
might consider including different asset markets (sovereign bonds, corporate bonds, stock 
markets, the banking sector) in a single VAR. This is important given that markets interact, which 
in the European context holds especially for sovereign bond markets and the banking sector. 
Second, we examine the effect of rating decisions, but those arguably have important effects on 
sovereign bond prices on other asset markets as well both domestically and abroad. Adjustments 
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of sovereign ratings affect the financing costs of firms and banks (Kaminsky and Schmukler, 
2002). The sovereign bond rate puts a floor under the bond market, as sovereign bonds are 
usually considered to be the safest asset. Business financing on bond markets should suffer the 
consequences immediately, since rises in the bond rate translate directly into increases in the 
risk-free rate (the price channel).  
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APPENDIX 
Table A.1: Spillover Table, No Factor, Full Sample (May 2000–February 2012) 
 
 CZE POL HUN AUT FIN NLD FRA BEL ESP ITA GRC PRT IRE DNK SWE GBR 
From 
others 
CZE 57.80 8.26 7.32 2.76 0.57 0.81 1.81 3.02 3.83 4.42 0.88 0.91 2.13 4.45 1.00 0.03 42.20 
POL 7.36 64.89 6.77 1.17 0.22 0.24 0.82 1.89 2.59 3.15 1.16 1.19 2.06 5.64 0.83 0.02 35.11 
HUN 7.35 9.42 58.32 2.52 0.49 0.45 0.68 3.21 3.20 3.86 1.77 1.40 3.32 3.86 0.09 0.06 41.68 
AUT 2.04 1.85 3.09 26.28 4.63 7.83 11.58 13.28 8.97 11.07 2.41 1.82 4.48 0.47 0.11 0.09 73.72 
FIN 1.83 1.15 0.94 10.22 31.55 12.91 10.59 9.55 5.34 6.06 1.65 1.66 4.30 1.04 0.49 0.72 68.45 
NLD 1.92 1.00 1.92 9.29 10.04 30.56 10.04 9.18 6.51 6.33 1.90 2.75 5.22 1.61 0.56 1.16 69.44 
FRA 1.85 1.60 1.85 11.51 4.61 7.86 22.79 14.15 9.80 13.81 2.80 1.63 3.93 1.17 0.33 0.31 77.21 
BEL 1.96 1.65 2.07 8.35 3.00 5.29 9.50 24.56 15.64 15.95 2.22 2.67 6.63 0.26 0.16 0.09 75.44 
ESP 1.55 1.18 1.31 5.98 1.63 3.94 7.30 12.15 31.04 16.95 3.34 4.12 8.90 0.15 0.15 0.31 68.96 
ITA 2.02 1.60 1.61 4.54 1.46 3.03 4.91 14.25 20.39 30.38 3.49 4.26 7.70 0.21 0.07 0.08 69.62 
GRC 1.24 0.87 0.84 2.84 1.71 2.08 5.29 10.21 10.65 8.55 39.04 6.64 9.91 0.01 0.02 0.12 60.96 
PRT 0.85 0.72 1.06 2.37 0.29 0.89 1.41 9.23 10.83 7.07 6.42 40.85 17.79 0.01 0.16 0.04 59.15 
IRE 1.18 0.87 1.10 3.57 1.97 2.69 4.08 8.60 10.78 5.50 5.88 11.38 42.30 0.01 0.05 0.03 57.70 
DNK 4.32 4.47 5.14 1.35 2.38 2.44 2.44 0.61 0.26 0.35 0.32 0.25 0.35 69.44 5.68 0.19 30.56 
SWE 1.27 1.02 0.57 0.15 0.59 0.85 0.39 0.23 0.47 0.31 0.04 0.13 0.09 4.77 88.48 0.64 11.52 
GBR 0.21 0.15 0.14 0.34 0.85 1.93 0.54 0.26 2.01 0.86 0.31 0.94 0.82 0.13 1.16 89.37 10.63 
To others 36.95 35.83 35.74 66.98 34.44 53.23 71.37 109.81 111.27 104.24 34.59 41.74 77.63 23.79 10.86 3.88 852.35 
To others (+own) 94.75 100.73 94.06 93.26 65.98 83.79 94.16 134.36 142.31 134.62 73.64 82.59 119.94 93.23 99.34 93.24 53.3% 
From others 42.20 35.11 41.68 73.72 68.45 69.44 77.21 75.44 68.96 69.62 60.96 59.15 57.70 30.56 11.52 10.63  
Net spillover 5.25 -0.73 5.94 6.74 34.02 16.21 5.84 -34.36 -42.31 -34.62 26.36 17.41 -19.94 6.77 0.66 6.76  
                  
Share in spillover 
transmission
4.33 4.20 4.19 7.86 4.04 6.25 8.37 12.88 11.15 10.45 3.47 4.18 7.78 2.38 1.09 0.39  
Share in spillover 
absorption 
4.95 4.12 4.89 8.65 8.03 8.15 9.06 8.85 8.09 8.17 7.15 6.94 6.77 3.58 1.35 1.25  
Share in spillover 
overall 
9.29 8.32 9.08 16.51 12.07 14.39 17.43 21.73 19.24 18.62 10.62 11.12 14.55 5.97 2.44 1.64  
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Table A.2: Spillover Table, De-Factorised Spread Series, Full Sample (May 2000–February 2012) 
 CZE POL HUN AUT FIN NLD FRA BEL ESP ITA GRC PRT IRE DNK SWE GBR From 
others 
CZE 34.17 3.67 1.47 7.17 8.29 7.86 6.89 2.99 0.61 0.05 0.70 0.05 0.12 9.81 9.10 7.03 65.83 
POL 6.20 52.08 2.63 3.88 4.84 4.34 3.76 1.63 0.40 0.03 0.13 0.03 0.05 9.21 6.26 4.53 47.92 
HUN 4.96 8.34 82.36 0.23 0.24 0.10 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.15 0.04 0.01 0.07 2.91 0.36 0.17 17.64 
AUT 1.85 0.33 0.01 16.39 13.88 14.00 13.68 8.03 1.45 0.14 0.60 0.02 0.09 8.05 10.63 10.87 83.61 
FIN 2.20 0.38 0.03 12.65 15.77 14.37 13.25 7.66 1.46 0.10 0.54 0.03 0.10 8.81 11.09 11.57 84.23 
NLD 2.23 0.36 0.01 12.53 14.42 15.42 13.17 7.63 1.62 0.11 0.50 0.07 0.11 9.01 11.10 11.72 84.58 
FRA 1.89 0.33 0.03 12.75 13.72 13.82 15.64 8.30 1.75 0.37 0.46 0.01 0.06 8.69 10.93 11.23 84.36 
BEL 1.15 0.16 0.06 10.86 11.51 11.76 12.66 19.25 5.55 1.90 0.80 0.05 0.19 5.59 9.37 9.13 80.75 
ESP 0.59 0.05 0.37 6.94 7.21 8.00 8.96 8.10 33.68 6.27 0.03 0.59 1.54 3.31 6.77 7.62 66.32 
ITA 0.59 0.08 0.32 4.38 6.15 6.35 5.44 9.77 17.27 33.91 0.02 0.52 0.63 2.87 5.64 6.06 66.09 
GRC 1.61 0.59 0.30 6.30 5.26 5.73 3.97 0.87 0.20 0.05 55.60 2.08 2.37 6.09 5.03 3.95 44.40 
PRT 0.09 0.11 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.10 1.99 4.37 0.47 4.39 71.12 16.79 0.22 0.10 0.08 28.88 
IRE 0.08 0.18 0.20 0.30 0.73 0.63 0.53 1.36 3.70 1.74 3.29 12.77 73.61 0.20 0.23 0.46 26.39 
DNK 2.90 0.86 0.09 11.44 13.42 13.18 12.23 6.35 0.84 0.03 0.55 0.02 0.03 15.40 11.91 10.77 84.60 
SWE 2.71 0.67 0.02 11.26 12.91 12.84 11.70 6.82 1.89 0.19 0.43 0.10 0.09 9.60 17.96 10.82 82.04 
GBR 2.32 0.46 0.01 11.22 12.98 13.21 11.79 6.98 2.36 0.31 0.39 0.17 0.16 8.27 10.89 18.49 81.51 
To others 31.37 16.56 5.59 111.97 125.60 126.24 118.12 78.48 43.50 11.91 12.85 16.51 22.39 92.63 109.40 106.01 1029.14 
To others (+ own) 65.55 68.64 87.94 128.35 141.37 141.67 133.76 97.73 77.19 45.82 68.45 87.63 96.00 108.03 127.36 124.50 64% 
From others 65.83 47.92 17.64 83.61 84.23 84.58 84.36 80.75 66.32 66.09 44.40 28.88 26.39 84.60 82.04 81.51  
Net spillover 34.45 31.36 12.06 -28.35 -41.37 -41.67 -33.76 2.27 22.81 54.18 31.55 12.37 4.00 -8.03 -27.36 -24.50  
                  
Share in spillover 
transmission
3.05 1.61 0.54 10.88 12.20 12.27 11.48 7.63 4.23 1.16 1.25 1.60 2.18 9.00 10.63 10.30  
Share in spillover 
absorption 
6.40 4.66 1.71 8.12 8.18 8.22 8.20 7.85 6.44 6.42 4.31 2.81 2.56 8.22 7.97 7.92  
Share in spillover 
overall 
9.44 6.27 2.26 19.00 20.39 20.48 19.67 15.47 10.67 7.58 5.56 4.41 4.74 17.22 18.60 18.22  
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